Notes to Chapter 9: Ras�bh�sa and hāsya

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2)     In passing, we may underline the difference between hāsya based on the �semblance of rasa� (ras�bh�sa) and Freud�s category of �humor�. Though both are primarily emotion-centered (JU p.293), �humor� as a defense-mechanism includes only all the painful or distressing emotions within itself (JU pp.297-98), whereas ras�bh�sa covers all including the pleasant emotions. Again �humor� comprehends only worldly emotions (sth�yin), whereas ras�bh�sa is an eminently aesthetic category where even the painful elements are relished (as in karuna-rasa or even tragedy). This is because even where there is (incipient) empathy with another�s sorrow, in �humor� this results only in (�economized�) pity which, though �one of the most frequent sources of humorous pleasure� (JU p.295), nevertheless remains a distressing world emotion. The �economized� incipient aesthetic identification with the �shraya�s sorrow in the �semblance of pathos� (karun�bh�sa; cf. infra) is an impersonal relish that has nothing to do with pity (cf. Abhinava�s criticism of Shr�shankuka�s interpretation of karuna as being no more than the dramatic transposition of worldly pity (day� = karun�); Abhinavabh�rati GOS I, p.317; cf. M&P Aesthetic Rapture II, p.86, note 441). Empathy in an aesthetic context renders even painful affects relishable. Finally, whereas Freud seems to imply that there is total �economy� i.e., no empathy in �humor�, ras�bh�sa is generally based on a breach of, hence partial, �identification� (tanmay�bhavana). Freud was not a Tantric metaphysician like Abhinava engaged in the spiritual transmutation of the dross emotions nor even really an aesthetician proper. This comparison was merely intended to throw the spotlight on the radically different manner in which Western theorists and Indian aestheticians have drawn their fundamental distinctions, no doubt reflecting their divergent purposes and preoccupations.

3)     Even Prof. Kuiper, who insists that the vid�shaka�s original (= real?) function was a purely metaphysical or ritual, in any case symbolic, one as the representative of the awe-inspiring Vedic Varuṇa, is nevertheless obliged to admit that in the classical plays (and, in fact, even the prescriptions of the Nāṭya Sh�stra) he is invariably a comic figure. Cf. chapter VI, note 6 supra on the vid�shaka�s deformity as source of laughter. Whereas Kuiper's main efforts have been directed towards severing the links between the supposedly purely non-comic function of the �original� Nāṭya Sh�stra vid�shaka and the supposedly purely comic function of the later profanized vid�shaka of the classical plays, Abhinava�s simultaneous espousal of both his hāsya and hāsyābhāsa dimensions invites us, on the contrary, to concentrate our efforts on reconciling the two (only) seemingly incompatible aspects by reintegrating the ritual, aesthetic and social planes.�

4)     Cf. Nāṭya Sh�stra GOS XXVII.8, Bhat p.124: vid�shakoccheda-krtam bhavec chilpa-krtam ca yat / ati-h�syena tad gr�hyam prekshakair nityam eva hi /.� Uccheda means �disruption� (of the normal course of the action, dialogue or plot). The vid�shaka�s own (�tma-stha) explosive laughter is evidently also meant to ensure that the audience reacts to his incongruities as comic stimuli (with parastha-h�sa); cf. chapter VII, note 10 supra. But even the vid�shaka�s �excessive laughter� (atih�sa), like that of the Pāśupata in imitation of Rudra�s attah�sa, can, from the point of view of hāsyābhāsa, be attributed a non-comic function, viz. to signify his role as taboo-violator. See Introduction, above pp.22-24. Though the Pāśupata ascetic is obliged to indulge in comic behavior and thus make others laugh at himself and though his own spontaneous laughter no doubt contributes greatly to this effect, there can be no doubt that it serves primarily ritual function for the ascetic himself.

5)     We are thinking here especially of what Koestler calls �comic symbols�: �laughter or smiling frequently occur in response to stimuli which in themselves are not comic, but merely signs or symbols for comic stimuli, or even symbols of symbols�Chaplin�s boots, Groucho Marx�s cigar, caricatures of celebrities reduced to a few visual hints, catch-phrases and allusions to familiar situations. The analysis of these oblique cases often requires tracing back a long and involved thread of associations� (Act of Creation, p.61). The idea is borrowed from Bergson who tried to defend the over-narrowness of his own formula for the comic by replying that �beside the thing that is laughable by essence and in itself, laughable by virtue of its internal structure, there is a multitude of things that provoke laughter by virtue of some superficial resemblance to the former, or of some accidental relation with another that resembled the former, and so on; the reverberations of the comic is without end, for we like to laugh and all pretexts are good enough for us��(Rire, p.156; cf. also p.28). Thus the vid�shaka�s gluttony, modakas, crooked staff (kuṭilaka), inverse speech and understanding, deformity and other such stereotyped motifs appear as highly improper stimuli of hāsya to modern critical taste. Cf. Bhat, p.173; Indu Shekhar, Sanskrit Drama: Its Origins and Decline, passim. But the combined effect of their exaggeratedly incongruous presentation, repeated insistently in the midst of genuinely comic situations and ignited by the vid�shaka�s own laughter, could not have failed to transform them into �comic symbols� in the eyes of his traditional popular audiences. The privilege of hāsya is that, unlike the other emotions, we can be conditioned to perceive almost anything as double so much so that the �comic symbol� is not only charged by its history with a �latent� incongruity, but itself becomes a signal for us to �see double� and mobilize ourselves for laughter (cf. chapter II summary, supra, point 11, also point 10). When the vid�shaka has but barely entered the stage, the spectators, like children, must have already twitched their cheeks in anticipation.

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10) In the Locana version, Abhinava explains that �semblance�, �imitation� and �subordination� (amukhyat� = �non-primacy�) all mean the same thing in this context. The reason why the imitation of a rasa is equated to its mere semblance, apt to produce hāsya alone in the final analysis, is that during imitation we are equally aware of both that which is being imitated (anuk�rya, in this case �love� shrng�ra) and that which is imitating (anukart�, in this case R�vana who is an inappropriate �shraya), being unable to wholly submerge the latter cognition into the former due to some stubborn incongruity. It is because the perception of imitation as imitation is always bisociative, and tends to provoke hāsya, that Abhinava rejects Shankuka�s theory that rasa in the aesthetic context (drama) is the anuk�ra (�imitation�) of the corresponding emotions in the world. Abhinava, on the contrary, insists that we have only an �instrumental�, i.e., �subsidiary�, awareness of the configuration constituting the �imitator� (anukart�) on the stage, which is merged into or reorganized by the aesthetic cognition (anuvyavas�ya-vishesha) into the �focal� awareness of the �imitated� (anuk�rya) personage and scene. The two elements are not on the same level of a single act of awareness, the former being known only insofar as it contributes to the successful projection of the latter (Abhinavabh�rati I, pp.36-37, p.290, etc.). Here the cognition of the anuk�rya is primary (mukhya), whereas in the bisociative perception of imitation it is merely juxtaposed to the imitator (actor, etc.) and thus becomes secondary (amukhya) the bisociation itself and the hāsya it generates becoming now primary.

11) Does this term carvan�bh�sa mean the �semblance of relish� in the sense that there is actually no aesthetic relish at all of any kind but only an illusion of it, or does it simply mean that there is a very real relishing (of hāsya) which has the semblance of being the relishing of shrng�ra? The last lines of the Locana text leave no doubt that it is the second meaning alone that Abhinava has in mind. Ras�bh�sa, like the �suggestion of transitory moods� (bh�va-dhvani), etc., is only a subcategory of the �suggestion of rasa� (rasadhvani), mentioned separately on the basis of the particular element of the configuration that predominates in the total aesthetic relish of rasa. Just as the connoisseurs of blends of perfumes are able to isolate, even in the enjoyment of the wholly compounded scents, that the fragrance in question is due to the use of pure m�s� or some other ingredient. The term rasadhvani itself (though it comprises ras�bh�sa and other subcategories) is reserved for those instances where the connoisseur of the sth�yin, emerging from the configuration of determinants (vibh�va), consequents (anubh�va) and transitory states (vyabhic�rin), owes the excellence of his aesthetic relish primarily to the relishing of the sth�yin-element itself. This implies that what is really relished in ras�bh�sa is not the sth�yin (in this case, shrng�ra) which the configuration would have normally engendered, though there is the semblance of its relish, but the bisociated cognition responsible for hāsya and of which this shrng�ra forms only an element. But relish there certainly is. Quite apart from Abhinava�s clarification, if hāsya is relished as a rasa, it logically follows that this �relish� (carvan�) cannot be excluded from the various �semblances� (�bh�sas) that constitute hāsya. Compare Koestler: �to find the explanation why we laugh may be a task as delicate as analyzing the chemical composition of a perfume, with its multiple ingredients�some of which are never perceived, while others, sniffed in isolation, would make us wince� (Act of Creation, p.61).

12) �According to the canons of the Indian dramaturges, shrng�ra proper is developed only when there is mutual affection (paraspar�sth�bandha, Locana) between the couple, so much so that the outward manifestations (anubh�va) of love in one serves as the stimulants (vibh�va) of the same love in the other, and vice-versa; thus intensifying the experience of the basic emotion (rati) in a closed circuit. Though there are two complementary supports (�shraya)�the hero and heroine (nāyaka and n�yik�)�of shrng�ra, who are also mutual primary determinants (vibh�va ), they are so enmeshed in the harmony of their mutual interactions in the configuration of shrng�ra, that our identifications with each of them no longer appear distinct, but are fused together in a single undifferentiated relish of shrng�ra (Abhinavabh�rati I, p.302; cf. M&P, Aesthetic Rapture II, p.80, note 415). This is precisely why shrng�ra claims such a privileged rank among all the rasas in its relishability. In R�vana�s case, not only does this union of two complementary identifications not take place, but our knowledge of S�t�s indifference or hostility clashes diametrically with our partial identification with R�vana�s sentiments. We experience not the abiding emotion (sth�yin) of love (rati) but the transitory (vyabhic�rin) form of it which, due to the configuration, has the appearance of the sth�yin. But this is not due to pure imagination on our part, but has an objective basis in the resemblance between the real shrng�ra and its imitation, as when a shell is mistaken for silver due to its silver-like glitter.

13) In the Locana, he says that �though Bharata has described hāsya as the imitation of shrng�ra, the relishing of hāsya is only subsequent� and the appreciation of the verse taken in itself (without consideration of context, speaker, etc.) �is no occasion for the relish of h�sya� (cf. notes 13 and 14 in chapter VII).

14) Anaucitya. Abhinava uses the term here as an equivalent of �incongruity� (vikrti), whose connotations however are primarily cognitive and, at most, aesthetic, whereas aucitya has strong moral connotations though applicable in the aesthetic context as well (as in Kshemendra�s Aucityavic�racarc�). Evidently, a thing can be incongruous without being improper in the moral sense and, conversely, something can be morally unacceptable without however striking our aesthetic sensibility as being incongruous. But the two often coincide, and this is clearly the case where the exclusive operator of one of the bisociated fields is an ethical precept. This assimilation of incongruity with anucitya, without distinguishing the aesthetic and the moral connotations of the latter term, reflects Abhinava�s concern for harmonizing and mutually superimposing the socio-ethical and the aesthetic functions of the drama, so that they coincide in a single structure. The morally improper can always be exaggerated in its incongruous aspect so as to provoke laughter. Again, where the �legitimate goals of life� (purush�rtha) are concerned, the term aucitya refers not so much to the more restricted sense of moral propriety but to the wider more inclusive meaning of �the adequation of means to ends.�

15) Note that is not the determinant (vibh�va) of (the semblance of) shrng�ra but its consequents (anubh�va) and transitory states (vyabhic�rin) that now become the vibh�vas of hāsya. This is because in their former capacity they evoke shrng�ra (rather rati) as a constituent of the bisociation, even while their association with R�vaNa�s disqualifying features evokes the opposite reaction of contempt, etc.

16) In the Locana, he adds that �by shrng�ra the semblances of �heroism� (v�ra), etc. have also been implied.� The most obvious example of the �semblance of heroism� (v�r�bh�sa) is the vid�shaka�s show of mock-heroism when he attacks bees, mango-blossoms, and other harmless objects with his raised crooked staff (kuṭilaka).

17) In this statement, the incongruity and the bisociative theories of hāsya are clearly synthesized, for the incongruity is here given the function of bisociating those elements of another rasa whose mutual association normally gives rise to that rasa in its fully developed form. Thereby, these elements simultaneously project an opposing field that tends to cancel out the incipient normal rasa. If �impropriety� (anaucitya) is granted its full moral connotation here, this statement would also incorporate, by implication, the superiority theory of humor, though how exactly it fits in still remains to be explained. It is in the light of this statement that Abhinava�s later assertion that �all the rasas are included in h�sya� must be understood.

18) Cf. chapter I, note 19. Since Abhinava gives such an importance and precise significance to the distinction between rasa and bh�va on the one hand and their respective semblances on the other, we have to take all the more seriously his use of the paradoxical term �the semblance of h�sya� (hāsyābhāsa) with respect to the vid�shaka (cf. note 1 above). Evidently, since �the semblance of rasa (ras�bh�sa) = hāsya is the generally valid formula, we must accept that hāsyābhāsa = hāsya. But at the same time, a semblance of hāsya cannot evoke hāsya for in that case it would not be a semblance at all but real hāsya. So hāsyābhāsa the same as hāsya or not?

19) Nāṭya Sh�stra GOS chapter XVIII (vol. II), 103, where the �farce� (prahasana) in its �pure� (zuddha), as opposed to �mixed� (sank�rNa), form is defined as enacted by characters such as devotees of God (bhagavat), ascetics, brahmins and others (like Buddhist mendicants, etc., Abhinava adds) including base characters, and full of comic dialogues. However, the text (104) further specifies that the speech and conduct in this subcategory should not be �incongruous� (a-vikrta), which would seem to contradict their comic effect. Abhinava interprets avikrta here to mean �not false and not obscene� (asaty�zl�la-r�pau). Later day farces, like KrSNamizra�s Prabodhacandrodaya and Mahendravarman�s Mattavil�sa, illustrate this category where the correct means to spiritual deliverance is inculcated by parodying all the ascetics and doctrines of wrong ways. The Prabodhacandrodaya, for example, depicts the comic disputations between a Jaina and a Buddhist monk with a K�p�lika who worships Bhairava with his consort in the tantric mode. Whereas the �pure� farce seems to depend primarily on that mode of hāsya based on the semblance of tranquility (z�nt�bh�sa), the �mixed� farce, enacted by prostitutes, rogues, eunuchs and such varied characters, must have depended on the semblances of the other three goals of life (puruṣārtha). Abhinava cites the opinion of others who distinguish the two forms differently and apparently admits of this interpretation as well. Where the humor is based on characters who are by nature vile and ridiculous, this �impure� form of the farce would be mixed. Where the chief characters and their actions are not in themselves contemptible but become so due to their contact with or exposure to vile characters (or due to the assumption of such postures and behaviors by the latter), the farce is �pure�, because those who are by nature pure have become ridiculous through the defiling contact of others. This would seem to explain more satisfactorily the term avikrta in the definition of the �pure� type.

20) Though Abhinava again explicitly uses the term �semblance of humor� (hāsyābhāsa) with respect to the vid�shaka further on (see note 1 above), this is the only concrete illustration he gives of it. Upon the interpretation of this verse will therefore depend the resolution of the problem, posed in note 18 above, of the precise relation between hāsyābhāsa and real hāsya, are they the same or different? It appears to be a lament over the fact that ordinary people are no longer absorbed by (the dramatic representation of?) mythical tales, and hence no longer receptive to their hidden significance. The same meanings conveyed through the symbolic behavior of the laughing vid�shaka however completely engross the audience which responds with spleen-splitting laughter (see note 4 above), evidently because, being unable to restore their hidden coherence to the meaningless jumble of signs constituting his discourse, they take him for a joker (hāsya-krt); that is, because they are unable to completely identify themselves with the vid�shaka. hāsyābhāsa cannot be explained away as no more than the spectator�s parastha-h�sa (�laughter proceeding from or located in another�) at the vid�shaka�s incongruities provoked by his own �tmastha-h�sa (�laughter residing in oneself, i.e. autonomous laughter), because even this is only a case of hāsya (or h�sa) and not of its mere semblance. Moreover, Abhinava refers to the vid�shaka�s incongruities themselves (i.e., quite independently of his �tmastha laughter) as being only a semblance of hāsya (note 1 above). If it had been someone else, he would have surely used the term hāsya instead as he does elsewhere. We propose therefore that not only these incongruities vehicle a profound non-comic symbolic function exteriorized and made acceptable through a comic presentation but that even their comic aspect is recycled into the symbolic function. To be more precise, the incongruity inherent in transgression that renders is it an apt �determinant� (vibh�va) of hāsya (see p.177 above) is generalized into comic incongruity that comes to symbolize the �original� transgression that is now minimized, disguised or even wholly eliminated. The best illustration of this principle is the �inverse� or �contrary� speech of the vid�shaka, shared by the incestuous fifth head of Brahmā, which ethnological studies have conclusively shown to be a form of symbolic behavior accompanying taboo-violation not only in ritual clowning, where it also serves a comic function, but also in secret societies where the latter function is inoperative. A careful study of Arjuna�s incongruous (vikrta) appearance (as the eunuch Brhannal� in female attire) and behavior in the Vir�ta parvan of the Mah�bh�rata will reveal that it likewise symbolizes the transgressive aspect of the embryonic regression that underlies the whole symbolism of this exile incognito.

It has also been suggested that the word �tatra� (hāsyābhāsa) should be read not as �among these semblances of rasa (ras�bh�sas)� but as �in the farce (prahasana),� in which case this example of hāsyābhāsa would not be referring to the vid�shaka at all but to the vulgar (= �improper�) �humor of the farces; after all, no explicit references to him is found in the verse cited. To this it must be objected that when referring to the vid�shaka�s own hāsyābhāsa further on (note 1), Abhinava simply says �(but) this has already been discussed before.� To our knowledge, this is the only preceding text-place where Abhinava even mentions hāsyābhāsa and hence it can likewise only refer, at least primarily, to the vid�shaka himself. Also �his (amuSya: singular) boisterous laughter evoking the spectator�s �excessive laughter� (hence �holding both his sides� p�rzvopap�Da) perfectly fits his role (note 4) whereas it is not an accurate description of the prahasana where our laughter is rather at the ridiculous seriousness of the characters portrayed, unless of course, if one accepts the possible role of the vid�shaka in the farce (not attested).

21) It is not wholly clear what exactly Abhinava considers to be the �semblance of sorrow� (karuN�bh�sa) here. It is also peculiar, considering his customary lucidity, that he does not bother to explain how this category and the notion of �relationship� (bandhut�) is to be applied in this unusual case. Is the karuN�bh�sa here independent of the �semblance of humor� (hāsyābhāsa) or does it, on the contrary, presuppose the latter in its opposition to hāsya proper? If, as we believe, the second assumption is the correct one, this would explain Abhinava�s enigmatic procedure as being due to the same reluctance that holds him back from clarifying how the vid�shaka is the focus of the �semblance of humor� (hāsyābhāsa). V�managupta is lamenting (anga �alas!�) over the fact that ordinary people are interested only in the hāsya that they eagerly discover in the vid�shaka and completely miss his hidden symbolic function underlying this semblance of humor. But this �pity� is misplaced because the profane (loka has often this connotation) are themselves not experiencing any suffering on that account, and their condition appears wretched only in the eyes of the poet who recognizes only the �semblance of humor� where they seem to see humor. As such, it is not possible for Abhinava to identify himself wholly with this (misplaced) �pity� and the incongruity results in a �half-pity� productive of hāsya. If karuN�-rasa is always based on an �exclusive determinant� (as�dh�raNa-vibh�va),� this is because there is a �kinship� (bandhut�) between the �support� (�zraya) and the determinant (vibh�va), that does not exist between the connoisseur and the vibh�va, and hence requires the spectator�s identification with the �zraya. Abhinava�s remark must then be interpreted as meaning that between those who recognize the �semblance of humor� in the vid�shaka and those who see only hāsya, there is or can be no �kinship�. We are unable to offer a more satisfactory explanation here. Raghavan solves the problem by simply reading ata evod�haraNam, instead of etad eva, which implies that the above verse is not an example of karuN�bh�sa at all. Though he indicates mss. G only as reading etad, the GOS edition seems to read etad in both the manuscripts.

22) This is why, Abhinava says, Bharata did not include the term sth�yin (�permanent emotional disposition�) in his famous axiom (rasa-s�tra) on the �production� of aesthetic emotion: tatra vibh�v�nubh�va-vyabhic�ri-samyog�d rasa-niSpattih // Nāṭya Sh�stra VI.32. He completely rejects Zr�zankuka�s theory that �it is the sth�yin made known through the vibh�vas, etc., that is called rasa on account of its relishability� by retorting that, if this were so, the perception (inference) of emotions in others in worldly life should be even more relishable than in the drama, because the former are real whereas the emotions inferred in the drama are unreal. It is only because of �propriety� (aucitya) that one says that �the sth�yin is transformed into rasa,� and this �propriety� merely consists in stimuli firmly established in their capacity to produce various sth�yins (in the world) now being relishable in the form of vibh�vas in the drama. Hence, what is inferred in the drama is only the sth�yin and never rasa. Where, as in the case of the �semblance of rasa� (ras�bh�sa), the sth�yin inferred no longer corresponds to the rasa (here hāsya) evoked, it would no longer be �proper� to say that the sth�yin has become the rasa. Cf. Abhinavabh�rati I, p.284, translated in Gnoli, AE, pp.20-21, 80-81.

23) [text on puruṣārthas] [Sanskrit text] The primacy of these four rasas is precisely due to their correlation with the four aims of life, and their varying distribution is an important factor in the classification of the different types of dramatic genres (r�paka). He goes on to clarify that the four �secondary� rasas, from this point of view, may yet be �primary� due to their popularity and ease of appreciation by the world at large. Such is especially the case with humor (hāsya). But even these can be made to serve the legitimate goals of life (puruṣārtha) by presenting them as accessories (�limbs�) of the primary rasas. [Sanskrit text] Abhinavabh�rati I, p.282. After emphasizing that all the basic emotional dispositions (sth�yin) are innate in all human beings though in differing proportions, he goes on to add that in some people these emotional attitudes are directed towards proper or adequate objects whereas in others they are not. Hence only some of these attitudes are to be inculcated as conducive to the puruṣārthas. And distinctions such a �one of excellent character� (uttama-prakrti) are based on (the nature of) the (primary) determinants (vibh�va) of (the rasas associated with) these puruṣārthas. [Sanskrit text]. Such analyses in terms of the puruṣārthas are scattered throughout Abhinava�s commentary on Bharata beginning from the first chapter of the Nāṭya Sh�stra itself. Cf. also Abhinavabh�rati I, p.341, as to why there are only nine rasas: evam te navaiva ras�h / pumarthopayogitvena ra�jan�dhikyenav� iyat�m evopadzyatv�t /

24) See especially, M. Biardeau, L�hindouisme: anthropologie d�une civilisation (Paris 1981), �Les quatre buts de l�homme� (pp.49-74). Anyone who carefully studies this book will realize how very relevant Abhinavagupta�s categories still are to the contemporary understanding of traditional Hindu civilization as coherent system of values despite the seemingly uncontrollable profusion at the empirical and historical level. At the same time, the study of the values invested in the vid�shaka in relation to Abhinava�s own commitment to the perennial tradition of esotericism at the heart of Hindu culture (see citations from Renou in the following chapter) will no doubt reveal what is still lacking to crown this magnificent edifice reconstructed by her. Cf. also especially the excellent article by Prof. Charles Malamoud, �On the Rhetoric and Semantics of puruṣārtha,� pp.33-54, Contributions to Indian Sociology, vol. 15, nos. 1 & 2, January-December 1981, dedicated to Louis Dumont.

25) Virasan�, where we have taken the prefix vi- in an intensive sense as �in a special manner� (vizeSaNa), unlike Gnoli who takes it in a privative sense translating �which will arouse, at the end, no sensation of disgust (as accompanies all ordinary pleasures).� Not only does this not at all fit the context, but we are unaware of Abhinava using virasan� anywhere else in the sense of �disgust� and we are unable to see from where in the text Gnoli has introduced� the negation �no�disgust.� Moreover, paryanta qualifies pramoda-s�ra (and not virasan�) as culminating the aesthetic experience to which the virasan� is the means.

26) l�Dh�tmaka in the mss. (M, G) corrected into l�n�tmaka in G, which is the reading accepted by Gnoli (with samarpaka): �gives birth, within him, to a kind of injunction suitable to be expressed by the optative mood� (AE p.97). We have taken l�Dh�tmaka in a sense akin to l�n�tmaka: �swallowed up,� but both ideas seenm to be involved�a subliminally communicated injunction.

27) Abhinavabh�rati I P.36, amended by Gnoli, AE pp.89-90. Our rendering of the text may profitably be compared to Gnoli�s translation (AE pp.96-98) which, in our opinion, contains several errors only one of which we have pointed out in note 26 above. For example, pr�Na-vallabh�pratima-, which he interprets as �not to be compared to (the pleasure given us by the sight of) our beloved one� actually refers to the contrast between the delightful way in which drama seduces us into assimilating its hidden value-system and the dry didactic manner in which the religious texts (z�stras) externally impose the same. The image (k�nt�-sammita) is a recurrent one in Abhinava.

28) The mixture in the �farce� (prahasana) of the �sentiment of tranquility� (z�nta-rasa) with incongruities that belong properly to the context of other rasas that are not oriented towards spiritual emancipation (mokSa), not only has the function of inculcating the rejection of these improprieties but also of making z�nta-rasa accessible to the vast majority of the spectators who would otherwise have no interest in it and probably remain at home. In enjoying humor (hāsya ) based on the �semblance of tranquility� (z�nt�bh�sa), they have been as it were �tricked� into enjoying z�nta itself. The enjoyment of the admixture of the sentiments of love (śṛngāra), heroism (v�ra), etc., is indissociable from the relishing of z�nta. This is one of the arguments Abhinava gives against those who object that it is impossible to represent z�nta successfully or effectively in drama. [Sanskrit text ????] Abhinavabh�rati I, p.339, corrected by M&P, SR p.118, and translated on p.138. This conception of z�nta being made appealing by wrapping it in the form of z�nt�bh�sa with hāsya also helps clarify the following corrupt passage: [Sanskrit text ????] Abhinavabh�rati I, p.340; cf. M&P, SR p.119. Rejecting Raghavan�s later reading abhinayopagitay� for his original reading anupabhogitay�, M&P have raised a number of problems that we cannot answer in detail here (SR p.142, and notes 2,3,4), though the readings suggested by us eliminate them. The utpatti here refers to the four-fold causal scheme between the rasas discussed above, and this should be obvious from the fact that it immediately follows the question of the color of the deity presiding over z�nta. There the relation between z�nta and hāsya was subsumed under the first category of the �imitation of śṛngāra� (zrng�r�nukrti), i.e. the �semblance of love� (zrng�r�bh�sa), giving rise to hāsya, for the �semblance� (�bh�sa) of z�nta too is verily hāsya. Its relation to �heroism� (v�ra) and �disgust� (b�bhatsa) is defined by the fourth category of the sharing of common determinants (saha-vibh�va), exemplified by the �disgust-fear� (b�bhatsa-bhay�naka) couple. The determinants (vibh�va) of �pure disgust� (zuddha-b�bhatsa, Abhinavabh�rati I, p.331) and �compassionate heroism� (day�-v�ra, ibid., pp.337-79) are extraordinary determinants of b�bhatsa and v�ra evoking z�nta at the same time so that its enjoyment is blended with that of these rasas. Thus when evoked both in its pure form and accompanied by these mixed forms in the context of direct spiritual edification, z�nta-rasa, despite all the difficulties inherent in its presentation, can still become the predominant rasa of a drama pervading its entire plot, and bear the supreme fruit (of liberation).

29) [Sanskrit text ???] Abhinavabh�rati I, p.36. Unlike Gnoli (AE p.90) who reads anuvrtti with Ramakrishna Kavi instead of the original anivrtti, we have taken the latter together with nivartante as meaning �non-cessation�. Abhinava is here clearly thinking of the social functions of laughter when he asserts that only those who fear ridicule desist from such behavior. Evidently, it can have little effect on those like the Pāśupatas who actively courted laughter and dishonor through their ridiculous behavior.

30) J.O. Hertzler (1970), Laughter: A Socio-Scientific Analysis. New York: Exposition Press.

31) Cf. Monier-Williams Dictionary: �(in ironical sense)�(= nindita-brahman);� also Prthv�dhara ad MrcchakaTik� I.42 (p.49, commentary p.45, Kale edition): mahābrāhmaṇaz c�ND�lah. But also see Kale�s notes (p.29): �But here though used in good humor, it is used in a good sense as will appear from the subsequent action of the ViTa.� The problem then is how to reconcile this �good� sense with the clearly derogatory one.

32) O.E. Klapp (1972). Heroes, Villains, and Fools: The Changing American Character. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

33) H.R. Pollio and J.W. Edgerly, �Comedians and Comic Style,� Humor and Laughter, p.216.

34) Edwin Gerow, �Plot Structure and the Development of Rasa in the Z�kuntala; part I� (JAOS vol. 99, no. 4, Oct-Dec. 1979), has recently interpreted the whole play in terms of the opposition and reconciliation of �duty� (dharma), as manifested in the enjoyment of the �sentiment of heroism� (v�ra-rasa), and �love� (k�ma), as śṛngāra, with the various stages of the plot development reflecting the changing modalities of their mutual interaction. Their harmonious equilibrium is attained in their royal scion Bharata who is born of their� k�ma only to seal it with the bond of dharma. Such an approach, integrating the socio-religious (puruṣārtha) and aesthetic (rasa) dimensions is wholly in the spirit of Abhinava�s own conception of the Sanskrit theater. But it is this very dialectic of the puruṣārthas that the vid�shaka himself consistently refuses to get caught up in, though in his faithfulness to the hero (nāyaka) he does stand in a positive relationship to them.

35) Nāṭya Z�stra KM XXXV.25 pratyutpanna-pratibho / KS XXXV.71 praktyutpanna-pratibho

36) A.N. Upadhye, Candralekh�, Bh�rat�ya Vidy� Series, vol. 6, Bombay, vol. 1945; �Introduction�, pp.26-27.

37) J.T. Parikh, The vidūṣaka: Theory and Practice (Sravajanika Education Society, Surat 1953), p.33.

 

[this concludes the Footnotes to chapter 9: �Ras�bh�sa and H�sya�]