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ABHINAVAGUPTA'S AESTHETICS AS A SPECULATIVE PARADIGM*

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An argument is made for the aesthetic grounding of the great Kashmiri philosopher's metaphysical theology—rather than the more usual reverse argument. A new translation of the *Śāntarasaprakaraṇa* of Abhinava's *Bhārati* is appended, which both improves Masson's and Patwardhan's version, and supports the above interpretation.

SINCE THE PUBLICATION OF K. C. Pandey's pioneering *Indian Aesthetics*, one of the leitmotifs of scholarship on Abhinavagupta's remarkable aesthetic theory has been commentary on its "philosophical" basis.¹ The main thrust of this inquiry has borne on Abhinava's own expositions of the Kāśmīri Śaiva tradition, which provide the necessary background for an assessment of his aesthetics.² While not wishing in any way to contest the usefulness of this approach, I have wondered for some time whether it would be equally illuminating to examine the main theses of Abhinava's metaphysics in the light of his aesthetics.³ In an equally important

study, *Śāntarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics*, J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan indirectly acknowledge this approach, when they describe Abhinava's famous tāntrika image in terms of its evidently aesthetic (*rasika*) framework. But in general, they, like Pandey, are more concerned with aesthetics as the dependent term of the relation—the term that profits most from being explained through the other.⁴ Interestingly enough, this very choice of a problem creates for Masson and Patwardhan something of a non-problem: they feel they have to ask why an essentially "religious man" such as Abhinava would expend such energy to buttress philosophically his aesthetics. Their answer, that he felt obliged to justify a secular literature in which he felt a "deep interest,"⁵ rings false; Abhinava's literary musings do not strike one as apologetic. I

* The author wishes to thank Sunthar Visuvalingam for his many helpful comments on and criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper. This version has been materially improved by responding to, and indeed incorporating some of, them. Needless to say, any remaining infelicities should be attributed to me.

¹ Ch. 2, pp. 74ff., esp. p. 91: "The main object of the[se] volumes, which are being written on Abhinavagupta, is, therefore, to revive the monistic Śaiva tradition and to put his aesthetic theory in the proper perspective of his general philosophy."

² Esp. the voluminous *Tantrāloka* and the two *Vimarśinīs*—the *Ī(śvara)P(ratyabhijñā)V.* and the *Ī(śvara)P(ratyabhijñā)V(ivṛtti)V.*—Abhinava's chief expositions of Śaivism in the tāntrika and the śāstraic perspectives. All have been published in the Kashmir Sanskrit Series, but my references to the *I.P.V.* herein are to K. A. Subramania Iyer's and K. C. Pandey's edition (in two volumes: Allahabad, 1938 and 1950), which also contains the *Bhāskari* of Bhāskaraṇṭha. Abhinava's *Parātrimśikāvivarāṇa* also makes many substantial comments on the arts, esp. music.

³ . . . not, indeed, by adopting the straightforward strategy of T. S. Eliot, who has at times seemed to want to consider religious liturgy an object of delectation, but nevertheless suggesting that Abhinava's "world view" owes as much to his psychology of awareness as his theory of art does to his notion

of salvation. See Eliot's essay on Lancelot Andrewes, quoted in F. O. Matthiessen, *The Achievement of T. S. Eliot*, 125; also the remarks on Eliot which conclude my essay "Rasa as a Category of Literary Criticism" (in *Sanskrit Drama in Performance*, ed. R. V. Baumer and R. Brandon [Honolulu, 1981], 253–54).

⁴ *Śāntarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics* (Poona: B.O.R.I., 1969), a work which brings together conveniently many of Abhinava's dispersed pronouncements on aesthetics. The authors observe (p. 158): "This then is Abhinava's final position. To have provided a coherent philosophy of aesthetic experience is no small achievement." The brief text conveying the *rasika* image, the "Dhyānaśloka," is translated by Pandey (*Abhinavagupta*, 2nd ed. [Varanasi, 1963], 20–22). In that connection, Masson and Patwardhan observe (p. 40), "What is of interest to us is the similarity this process bears to a dramatic performance. . . ." Yeats' two poems, "Sailing to Byzantium" and "Byzantium," might also be adduced as illustrations of the transformation of ritual into art.

⁵ *ŚAPA*, viii, "Introduction."

think, rather, we may better appreciate *Abhinava's* problem by asking how a sovereign aesthetics might help a Śaiva mystic develop a philosophically accountable notion of the Lord, who is, after all, *at play*.

The problem we propose accords as well most straightforwardly with the chronology of *Abhinava's* works accepted by Pandey.⁶ On his view, *Abhinava's* mature period is defined by his two *Vimarśinīs*, which present a fully developed *theory of recognition* [*pratyabhijñā*]⁷—that the world in its active multiplicity is a real manifestation (*spanda*) of a single conscious essence.⁷ Our task here will be to ask how these works may profitably be read in the light of *Abhinava's* novel and remarkable aesthetic speculations.⁸

I believe, as do Masson and Patwardhan, that *Abhinava's* notion of *śānta rasa* ('tranquillity') provides the nexus through which the relation between philosophy and aesthetics is characteristically developed. *Śānta rasa*, indeed, occurs at the cutting edge of the issue we are both concerned with. But while they seem content to view this unprecedented ninth *rasa* as the philosophical "buttress" that the aesthetic theory needs, I will again⁹ concentrate on the paradox that it implies, both for *Abhinava's* aesthetics and his metaphysics. The ninth *rasa* is a *rasa* in a different sense than the other eight of the tradition. To assert it as a *rasa* involves an aesthetic paradox, for while the eight *rasas* are clearly

understood as modifications¹⁰ of the basic emotional constituents [*bhāva*] of our mundane personality, the new *rasa* implies rather a suppression of those very constituents: it is a state untroubled by emotion of any sort. That is why, of course, the discussion of *śānta rasa*, in the Indian texts, is chiefly an inquiry into its *sthāyin*, that is, is an effort to discover the *bhāva* that may without contradiction be assigned to it, and of which it is a "modification." If it should appear that *śānta rasa* has, in fact, no corresponding *bhāva*, then its status as a *rasa* would not only be paradoxical in explanation, but impossible of manifestation—something like a "hare's horn."¹¹ I will discuss *Abhinava's* solution to this paradox below, as well as Masson's and Patwardhan's account of his solution, but first, I want to point out that *śānta rasa* poses also a paradox, in an even greater sense, for *Abhinavagupta's* philosophical thesis.

Śānta rasa, all agree, derives its pretext from the fourth *puruṣārtha* ('life goal'): *mokṣa*, 'liberation.' But *śānta rasa*, if indeed it functions as claimed by *Abhinava*, and is accomplished in the terms he proposes, would appear to possess the attributes of *mokṣa*, the supreme goal of life, and thus becomes either a synonym of *mokṣa*, or renders the latter notion superfluous. In either case, the boundary between "art" and "reality" (which is as important to *Abhinava* as it is to Aristotle) would disappear, and metaphysics would in effect have been reduced to aesthetics. There are several ways of stating the implications of this unpalatable reduction, but one of them is that the view thus sketched appears

⁶ *Abhinavagupta*, ch. 2 (pp. 27–77, esp. pp. 32–34); in general, the sequence of works provides a basis for dividing *Abhinava's* literary life into three periods: the *tāntrika*, the *ālaṅkārika*, and the *śāstrika*.

⁷ This has been called a "realistic monism"—to distinguish it from Śaṅkara's *idealistic* monism. Both *Vimarśinīs* are commentaries on the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* of Utpaladeva (to whom we owe the term *pratyabhijñā*), the first (also called the *Bṛhātī*) on Utpala's auto-commentary (*Vṛtti*), the second (or, *Laghvī*) directly on the *Kārikā*. It is usual to abbreviate the former, *I.P.V.V.*, the latter, *I.P.V.* Nota bene, by Pandey's account the shorter work is also the later work.

⁸ We will not make the stronger claim, though it is implied, that his theoretical work also owes a great deal to his aesthetic speculations.

⁹ See Edwin Gerow and Ashok Aklujkar, "On *Śānta Rasa* in Sanskrit Poetics" (*JAOS* 92 [1972]: 80–87) for an earlier treatment—exclusively from the perspective of aesthetic theory. (This was a review article of Masson's and Patwardhan's book.) Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya's very laudatory review of *ŚAPA* may also be consulted: "*Śāntarasa* et Advaita," *Journal Asiatique* CCLX (1972): 89–105. Bhattacharya, however, succeeds only in emphasizing the fundamentally "philosophical" character of *Abhinava's* aesthetics.

¹⁰ *Mutatis mutandis*. The question of what kind of modification—whether a real transformation or a "manifestation" of something more basic—has been discussed at length, and we may take *Abhinava's* answer to the question as a given. What we experience when we experience "*rasa*" is nothing more than those constituents themselves, freed from the contingent qualifications of concrete situation, etc. In other words, the aesthetic experience brings us, reflexively, into contact with the generalized possibility of experience itself: that *vāsanā*, which in Indian psychology denotes not only the latent impressions that our present life enlivens, but the vehicle underlying the continuity, and therefore the possibility, of experience from one life to the next. We experience, in art, not love for X, but love as such, insofar as all men share such a determination.

¹¹ See *Abhinava's* treatment of *śānta rasa*: *Abhinavabhāratī* (G.O.S. ed.), 1:332ff.; cited in extenso, and translated, *ŚAPA*, 113ff. My translation, which differs from theirs on several points, and solves many of the riddles they leave unresolved, follows.

too close to that of the Bengali Vaiṣṇavas: aesthetics has become, not a theory of beauty, but a formula for action—a practical ethic that does in fact not only improve us but fundamentally alters our condition. To see such a view already implied in Abhinava is not only anachronistic, but conflicts with several positions Abhinava clearly adopts, and which seem central both to his poetics and his metaphysics: for instance, that pleasure [*ānanda*] is the predominant mode of aesthetic experience, not instruction [*śāsana*, *vidhi*];¹² that the locus of the aesthetic experience in its primary form is the contemplative spectator, not the working actor (to say nothing of the author);¹³ and most importantly, that *rasāsvāda* and *brahmāsvāda* are analogically related, but differentiable, experiences.¹⁴

For these reasons and others, *śānta* rasa represents a challenge to Abhinava's philosophical position, as well as to his aesthetics. Because he cannot be equated with the activist Vaiṣṇavas, he must be understood as somehow distinguishing *śānta* and *mokṣa*. In this sense, his metaphysics does in fact depend on the solution to a problem that is "aesthetic"—the reality paradox of *śānta* rasa (*vis-à-vis* *mokṣa*) depends on resolving satisfactorily the aesthetic paradox of *śānta* (*vis-à-vis* the

other rasas). Abhinava's solution, I would claim, is ingenious, for he turns these twin paradoxes to his advantage: the paradoxes themselves contribute to his philosophical argument.

Mokṣa, indeed, gives opportunity to *śānta* rasa, and the ambiguity of the rasa *vis-à-vis* the other rasas is in part a function of the ambiguity of the *puruṣārtha vis-à-vis* the other *puruṣārthas*. Recognizing this parallelism constitutes the first step in confronting the paradox. To the *prima facie* objection that *śānta* does not belong to the realm of art at all, because the "absence of affection" is not worth representing and cannot be enjoyed, Abhinava replies that it would be unusual if one of the four *puruṣārthas*—and the most important, by all accounts—were so different from the others, in terms of its grounding in the human psyche, that it could not be seen as arising out of the human condition, and be incapable of appreciation in some sense. Just as the rasa *śrīṅgāra* is grounded on the fact of "passion" [*rati*], and its appreciation involves a certain generalization and depersonalization of that common experience (which is evidently linked to the *puruṣārtha kāma* [desire]), so it seems likely that the phenomenon of *mokṣa* is competent to sustain our fascination, especially as it already involves, as its essence, a certain kind of depersonalization and generalization of experience.¹⁵ But this likelihood is grounded on a very abstract notion of rasa and *puruṣārtha*; if *śānta* is to be defended as a rasa, it must be shown concretely in the same psychological nexus as the other rasas—which means, *in fine*, that it must be shown in proper and essential relationship to a concrete experience [*bhāva*], of which it is a pleasurable modification. If we can answer the question: what is its *bhāva*? then the ancillary questions: how is it represented? [what are its *vibhāvas*] and what are its dramatic effects? [what are its *anubhāvas*] will be readily answerable. But it seems that we have simply restated the aesthetic paradox.

Abhinava concludes, after a very intricate argument, that the *bhāva*, or concrete experience, on which *śānta* rasa depends is none other than the "Self" itself:¹⁶ the *ātman*, understood both as the permanent background¹⁷ against which all transient experiences (including the other rasas) are projected, and as the object of that ex-

¹² "tatra ye svabhāvato nirmalamukuraḥṛdayās ta eva saṁsārocitakrodhamohābhilāṣaparavaśamanaso na bhavanti | teṣāṁ tathāvidhadāśarūpakākarmaṇasamaye sādharmaṇarasanātmakacaranagrāhyo rasasañcayo nātyalakṣaṇaḥ sphuta eva . . . tena nātya eva rasā na loke" (*Bhārati* ad *N.Ś.* 6.33 [vol. 1, p. 291]). See also *I.P.V.* ad 1.5.12 (vol. 1, p. 249).

¹³ "ata eva teṣāṁ (saḥṛdayānāṁ) kāvyam eva prītyvutpatikt . . . | tatra ca naṭo dhyāyinaṁ ivedaṁdhyānapadam" (*Bhārati* ad *rasasūtra* [vol. 1, p. 287]). ". . . ye tv atathābhūtās teṣāṁ pratyakṣocitātathāvidharcarvanālābhāya naṭādiprakriyā | svagatakrodhaśokādīsankāṭaḥṛdayagranthibhañjanāya gītādiprakriyā ca muninā viracitā | sarvānuḡrāhakaṁ hi śāstram iti nyāyāt" (*Bhārati* ad *N.Ś.* 6.33 [vol. 1, p. 291]).

¹⁴ For Abhinava, as for Śaṅkara, the experience of absolute reality is marked by a "bliss" *ne plus ultra*: ". . . yad api vā (sukhaṁ) lokottaraṁ rasacarvanātmakam tataḥ . . . paramēśvaraviśrāntyanandaḥ prakṛsyate | tadānandavipruṇmātrāvbhāso hi rasāsvāda ity uktaṁ . . . asmābhiḥ" *Locana* ad *Dhvanyāloka* 3.44 (p. 228, N.S.P. ed.; quoted also *ŚAPA*, 154). Thus, though the relation between *rasāsvāda* and *brahmāsvāda* remains analogical, it confirms, by its quasiaesthetic formulation, the justice of our proceeding from aesthetics to metaphysics! Cf. K. Bhattacharya, "Śāntarasa et Advaita," 95ff., who also stresses the anticipatory character of *rasāsvāda*, citing (and retranslating) the difficult passage from Abhinava's *I.P.V.V.* (vol. 2, pp. 178–79) that Masson and Patwardhan translate on pp. 44–45 of *ŚAPA*.

¹⁵ *ŚAPA*, 114, ll. 1–3.

¹⁶ *ātmaiva . . . atra sthāyī*: *ŚAPA*, 115, ll. 26–27.

¹⁷ The metaphor of the "wall" (*bhitti*) occurs both in Abhinava's philosophic and in his aesthetic writings, e.g., *I.P.V.* ad 1.5.12 (p. 246), and *Bhārati* (vol. 1, p. 336). It is doubtless related to the mirror metaphor: below, n. 37.

perience which consists of total clarity and perspicuity [*tattvajñāna*]. But the ātman is also both the mode (as *tattvajñāna*) and the object of the *tapasvin*, the *mumukṣu*. Is then the aesthetic experience that which the yogin realizes? Or, is it art that provides the *via facillior* which then obviates the arduous journey of the yogin?¹⁸ If, like Plato, Abhinava has, at this point, collapsed the distinction,¹⁹ it is at the cost of the problems already noted. He seems to suggest this by referring approvingly to Gautama's view that *tattvajñāna* is a recognized stage in the achievement of mokṣa.²⁰ And as well, by pointing to the well-known yogic stages of *yama* and *niyama* as perhaps "helping" in the portrayal of śānta rasa.²¹ Yet this is an appearance only. Since Abhinava cannot be reasonably seen to have abandoned the distinction between "art" and "life," we are obliged to understand what he has in fact done by putting śānta rasa in the deadly serious context of salvation; to wit: the metaphysical paradox.

All roads thus converge on Abhinava's notion of śānta rasa. To resume: it is a rasa essentially different from the other rasas, pointing us toward philosophy; yet as having a psychic configuration similar to that of mokṣa, it risks, by its generality and ease, to make salvation "aesthetic." In aesthetic terms, it appears to lead us away from aesthetics; in philosophical terms, it appears to make philosophy unnecessary. If we can see that these conundra are versions of the same problem, perhaps we will get closer to Abhinava's meaning. By

¹⁸ We have, it seems, stumbled upon an Indian version of the art/life problem: witnessing a play is (or is not) activity essentially other than living the good life, is not (or is) reducible to (judgeable in terms of) life outside the theatre. In the West, the two opposed positions go back to (and have achieved their canonical formulation in) the moral aesthetics of Plato (the highest good is also the most beautiful thing; flute-playing is a danger to the state) and the imitative poetics of Aristotle (art is *modelled* on life; but its principles of construction and judgment are its own).

¹⁹ Of course, Plato's aim in not recognizing a distinction between art and life was to devalue art and subject it to the discipline of life (censorship, etc.); what Abhinava seems to be doing here is rather the reverse: the way to capture what is most serious in life is to value its aesthetic component.

²⁰ *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.2 (*ŚAPA*, 126, n. 5).

²¹ *ŚAPA*, 116, ll. 18–19. These are the preliminary and basic forms of yogic discipline: abstaining from actions not conducive to self-realization, and suppression of passions that distract the mind from concentration. *Yogasūtra* 2.30 and 32: "actions" such as *himsā*, "suppressions" such as *sauca*.

all accounts, not only does Abhinava's aesthetics infringe upon the matter of his philosophy, but his account of philosophical matters is distinctly "aesthetic." His doctrines themselves not only revolve around the paradoxes of śānta rasa; the paradoxes are also perhaps a way of asserting his doctrine. The key, I believe, lies in seeing why his philosophy presumes his aesthetics.

The fundamental difference between Abhinava's *advaita*²² and Śaṅkara's consists in the former's effort to explain and account for activity as a constituent element of the absolute—for Śaṅkara, of course, activity is itself a sign of lesser reality (*māyā*), which will fall away in the gnosis of the absolute. Logically, Abhinava's is a very risky thesis, for it appears to admit multiplicity and variety into the supreme principle.²³ Abhinava appears to abet this ambiguity by speaking of two powers (*śakti*) which together characterize the absolute: that of knowing (*jñāna*) and that of acting (*kriyā*).²⁴ On the face of it, a dualism similar to that of the Sāṅkhya seems to have been posited. The absolute, in its guise of "knowing" is manifested in the subjective world of awareness and reflection;²⁵ in its guise of "acting," in the objective world of presentation, typology and change.²⁶ Indeed, these postulates would appear to "realize" activity in a way more satisfying than Śaṅkara's, but at the expense of positing an inconsistency in the character of the absolute itself.²⁷

The dilemma, of course, repeats the problem we have posed above: the principle of the subject, whose idealization is a repose in the absolute consciousness—would appear inseparable from the principle of the object, which is realized in variety and activity; on the

²² The following outline is not intended in any sense to be original; it follows, in the main, the accounts of Pandey and Chatterji, and is seconded, where relevant, with appropriate quotations. My aim is to focus on those aspects of Abhinava's metaphysics which in themselves appear to presume, or to have the structure of, an "aesthetic."

²³ "... ekam anekasvabhāvaṁ katham syāt?": *I.P.V.* ad 2.1.1 (vol. 2, p. 9).

²⁴ "... jñānaṁ kriyā ca bhūtānaṁ jīvātāṁ jīvanāṁ matam": *I.P.V.* 1.1.3 (vol. 1, p. 61).

²⁵ Treated in the *jñānādhikāra*, and esp. in 1.5.11ff. Reality in this mode appears as *prakāśa*, 'illumination' or 'awareness.'

²⁶ Treated in the *kriyādhikāra*, esp. 2.1.1ff. Reality in this mode appears as *kriyā*, 'activity.' Evidently, the inspiration for Abhinava's "dualism" is not the Sāṅkhya, but Bhartṛhari.

²⁷ "... nanu parāmarśo nāma vikalpaḥ | sa ca avikalpaśudhasaṁvidvapuṣi bhagavati katham syāt?": *I.P.V.* ad 1.5.11 (vol. 1, p. 241).

other hand, a (re)active (or emotional)²⁸ consciousness, multiple as it is, would appear to stain the absolute, if it is to be involved in it, with the variety of ordinary life. For Abhinava, the dilemma is resolved in much the same way a similar paradox is resolved by Bharṭṛhari:²⁹ the seemingly opposed worlds of object and subject are made over into always corresponding aspects of a single consciousness, whose business (unlike the Sāṃkhya *puruṣa*) is not simply to be passively aware, but to provide for the underlying correspondence which every act of awareness supposes. Thus, its unity is in fact functionally dependent on maintaining a multiplicity; in being aware, the “I” is seen as a functioning agent³⁰ of this universal consciousness, which even to be possible, must have been given its objects. Consciousness, now understood as providing those objects which appear in their appropriate awareness in the individual consciousness, is termed *spanda*: the ever renewing and ever present ‘urge’ to be,³¹ an essential aspect of which is reflexive being, or individual awareness.³² In this way, the seemingly opposed aspects of subject and object—*jñāna* and *kriyā*—are made over, by the notion of creative correspondence—into the modus of realization of the one principle. The one is thus not the abstract and essentially empty unity of Śaṅkara, but is a plenitude in which we are privileged to share (by being conscious).³³ Abhinava is also better able to account for the apparent unreality of the given world, accepting the cognitive implications of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (as did Śaṅkara), but without accepting its ontological implications: nihil-

ism—“nothing” is.³⁴ In fact, what is, is the power of the Lord, who in each instant, maintains and renews an ever active creation—not only for the subject, but including the subject, whose activity is thus also “real.”

Put in another way, it may be said that the view which simply opposes subject and object is arbitrary, and fails to grasp the most essential fact of the opposition—that for every act of awareness, there is a corresponding content of awareness. The duality, which appears to be a precondition of consciousness, is in fact, when rightly understood, nothing more than a sign that consciousness is occurring: the *spanda*, which involves (indeed, requires) “me,”³⁵ but is equally implied by the mere presence of the object.³⁶

When we describe the absolute in this way, it does appear that the concrete multiplicity of awareness is not alien to it, but is, so to speak, its manner of being.³⁷ In the same way, it would make eminent sense for Abhinava to suppose that an aesthetic mode would figure in the very statement of the absolute principle itself.³⁸ Of course, the mere fact of concrete awareness is the absolute only in a sense; the mundane is the mundane, and we must make a major effort to acquire the absolute—or at least the sense of the absolute.³⁹ In this, the Śaivas and the Advaitins do not disagree. But if the absolute is as we have described it, the only apprehension of it that is possible is that of reflective awareness: the mundane consciousness becoming aware (not of its object—in this system, that is the given, the mundane) but of itself in the act of grasping its object: *vimarśa*.⁴⁰

²⁸ It should be borne in mind that the emotions are (re)active, in the sense of tying us to our environment and previous lives.

²⁹ Cf. *kārikā* 1.5.13 (vol. 1, p. 250): “*citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā parā vāksvarasoditā | svāntantram etan mukhyaṃ tad aiśvaryaṃ paramātmanah*”; and Abhinava thereon: “. . . pūrṇatvāt parā, vakti viśvam abhilapati pratyavamarśena iti ca vāk, ata eva sā svarasena cidrūpatayā svātmaviśrāntivapuṣā uditā sadānastamitā nityā aham ity eva” (pp. 253–54).

³⁰ See preceding note and citation.

³¹ “. . . ghaṭo hi sphurati mama . . . | madyaṃ sphuraṇaṃ spandanam āviṣṭam iti | spandanaṃ nāma kiñciccalanam, eṣaiva ca kiñcidrūpatā yad acalam api calam ābhāsate iti” (*I.P.V.* ad 1.5.14 [vol. 1, pp. 256–57]).

³² “. . . evam iśvarasyāpi . . . yad icchātmakaṃ vimarśanam aham ity etāvanmātratattvaṃ (na tatra kaścit kramaḥ . . .):” (*I.P.V.* ad 2.1.8 (vol. 2, pp. 25–26)).

³³ “. . . svātmavartina icchāspandodayasphuṭasphuritaviśva-bhāvanirbharatātmanah pūrṇatvasya . . .”: *I.P.V.* ad 2.3.17 (vol. 2, p. 142).

³⁴ Nor is the world a “mistake.”

³⁵ “. . . kumbhakāryāpāro nāma paramārthataḥ iśvarecchaiva tadavabhāsita kāyaspandaparyantā” (*I.P.V.* ad 1.8.9 [vol. 1, p. 419]).

³⁶ “bāhyatvaṃ nāma ābhāsāntaram iśvareṇa svāntantriyabalād eva” (*I.P.V.* ad 1.8.5 [vol. 1, p. 409]).

³⁷ The image of the mirror recurs frequently, e.g., *I.P.V.* ad 2.1.1 (vol. 2, p. 9): “atra ca uktaṃ citsvabhāvasya darpaṇasyeva ekatānapabādhanena ābhāsaśāmbhave ka iva virodha iti tasmāt pratyabhijñānabalāt eko 'pi asau padārthātmā svabhāvabhedān viruddhān yāvat aṅgīkurute tāvat te virodhād eva . . . tam ekaṃ kriyāśrayaṃ saṃpādayanti.” [Pandey’s text resolves saṃdhi between words where clarity would benefit.]

³⁸ “Aesthetic,” after all, derives from the Greek αἰσθησις, ‘awareness’.

³⁹ “. . . freedom consists in transcendency from the temporal order” (K. C. Pandey, “Introduction,” *I.P.V.*, xxxv).

⁴⁰ “so ‘ham iti vimarśaḥ” (*I.P.V.* ad 1.1.1 [vol. 1, p. 35] et passim). The *vimarśa* in and through which freedom is realized is called, simply, “recognition”—*pratyabhijñā*: “tasya [maheśvarasya] dāsyam ity anena tatpratyabhijñopapādanasya ma-

Thus is consciousness also essentially active, in its highest form.⁴¹ In this way, it may be understood that the primary reflexive apprehension of which we are capable is that of *rasa* itself—the emotional consciousness; not satisfied with delectation of itself in its appropriate content, be it the amorous act, or the heroic deed—it becomes aware of itself, as a generic awareness consisting of pure delight, utterly centered in itself—a condition we might call *rasatvam* (if it were not too Naiyāyika an expression).⁴² The content of this new awareness is then the very fact that consciousness has a content—but that original content must then appear as transient, for it is seen against the more fundamental background⁴³ of the act of apprehension itself. It seems, in other words, that we have again discovered *śānta rasa*—for Abhinavagupta, that emotional awareness in which all the other *rasas* are apprehended as possible. That this still may be termed an *emotional* awareness may be doubted by some; but for Abhinava, at least, it is not *mokṣa* that we therein apprehend (any more than *rasāsvāda* is identical to *brahmāsvāda*).⁴⁴ This is the essential point of difference: even though the concrete *rasas*, like the *bhāvas* they arise from, are

transient, they are essential in their very transiency—philosophically, if not indeed experientially—to the awareness that is *śānta*.

The notion of *mokṣa*, in this system, may, if anything, be said to be modelled on that of *śānta rasa*: the principle of reflexivity whose concrete (affective) realization is a kind of appreciation of transiency is given a rigorous cognitive dress in the “recognition” that the percipient subject⁴⁵ is the Lord’s agency. That this is also accompanied by delight may truly be said to express the fundamentally “aesthetic” character of *mokṣa* in this system.⁴⁶ But of course, it is not simply delight—as was the easier “recognition” of *śānta*. Liberation represents an active, and thorough, transformation of the life which sustains the cognition: it is not satisfied with a “delight” itself fundamentally impermanent.

In the final correspondence, then, it may be said that *śānta rasa* is to *mokṣa* as the concrete *rasas* are to the apprehension of “reality”; and the ratio works also vertically: both *śānta* and *mokṣa* involve reflexive apprehension of the act of awareness itself—which in its sense of immediacy, givenness, is variously manifested as purely cognitive “illumination” [*prakāśa*] on the one hand, and by the affective, or “reactive” absorption [*vimarśa*] in the collective substratum [*vāsana*] of our being, on the other.

In Abhinava’s world, then, the duality of subject and object has been replaced by a duality of modes of awareness: one immediate, involving as its essence transiency and dependence; the other reflective, surmounting that transiency and fully autonomous [*svatantra*]. But it may well be that the only “end” to transiency available to Abhinava is the awareness of the utterly creative power of the Lord—which does not so much put an end to the coruscating series of images [*vaicitrya*], as enfold them all: the understanding of the immanence of all things.⁴⁷ On this level, *śānta rasa* and *mokṣa* may indeed converge—but the standpoint is that of Śiva, and not perhaps that of the devotee. *Mokṣa* (or *śānta*) is as much as he may hope (in this

hāphalatvam āsūtrayati [kārikākṛt]” (*I.P.V.* ad 1.1.1 [vol. 1, p. 29]). *Vimarśa* differs from *prakāśa* in that the reflexivity is explicit, that is, has itself become a content of consciousness. See Pandey, *Abhinavagupta*, 324–25. *Prakāśa* is pure immediacy: “*tasmāt prakāśaḥ prakāśa eva*” (*I.P.V.* ad 1.5.4–5 [vol. 1, p. 211]).

⁴¹ Would it be too Spenglerian to suggest that in Abhinava we have found the Indian counterpart to Hegelian thought? Not only is the supreme principle a notion of reflexive (self-objectifying) consciousness, but Abhinava’s Sanskrit is at least as German as Hegel’s German is Sanskrit: “*yady api ca prakāśavimarśātmakam cidekaghanam ekam eva samvidrūpaṁ tathāpi vyutpādanāya tatparighaṭita eva ayaṁ vibhāgaḥ . . .*” (*I.P.V.* ad 1.8.1 [vol. 1, pp. 397–98]).

⁴² Not implying the “genus” present in the species, or the “species” present in the individual (which is not the usual Indian view, in any case)—but simply that “awareness” which is a generic thing, has (alone among genera) the capacity to posit itself as its object. See n. 131, below.

⁴³ *bhitti*: see n. 17, above.

⁴⁴ The celebrated analogy is most explicitly formulated in Abhinava’s *rasasūtra* commentary: “*rasaḥ . . . sattvodrekaprakāśānandamayānijasamvidviśrāntilakṣaṇena parabrahmāsvāda-savidhena bhogena param bhujyata iti*” (G.O.S. ed., vol. 1, p. 277). Though it appears there in a characterization of Bhaṭṭa-*āyaka*’s view, it is, along with most of *Nāyaka*’s thesis, accepted by Abhinava.

⁴⁵ . . . *that* (indeed)—but also *by*—the percipient subject!

⁴⁶ . . . doubtless accompanied, as it was for the Buddhist, by horripilation: “*. . . ānandaikaghanatvam, tad evāsya māheśvāryam*” (*I.P.V.* ad 1.8.11 [vol. 1, p. 423]).

⁴⁷ Or, what is the same thing, the understanding of all things as mere possibilities—not as givens. Which is to say: the understanding that *is* all things . . . (Thus again does Abhinava “realize” the Buddhist position: “*ata eva pratikṣaṇam pramāṭṣaṁyojanaviyojanavaicitryeṇa parameśvaro viśvaṁ sṛṣṭiśaṁhārādīnaṁ prapañcayati*” [*I.P.V.* ad 1.5.10 (vol. 1, p. 239)]).

life) to win. To Śiva alone is it given to laugh as his mode of creation.⁴⁸

Many theories of metaphor call attention to its reflexive character.⁴⁹ A general view on the subject of poetic diction is that it is self-referential—calls attention to itself as well as to what it says. If metaphor is the basic formal device of poetry⁵⁰—by which poetry itself is differentiated from non-poetic discourse—it would appear that Abhinava's notion that the absolute reality is reflexive consciousness is a necessarily poetic notion. And it has been given a psychology of aesthetics that firmly grounds its metaphysics in the processes of ordinary experience. Abhinava's world is thus doubly reflexive: one recognition moves the witness from private experience (*bhāva*) to a universal experience (*rasa*), the second moves him from a world that merely appears to him (i.e., seems to *be* before him), to one that is essentially his contemplation of it (i.e., one that is *for* him).⁵¹ The link between the two reflections is perhaps *śānta* rasa: the aesthetic contemplation of a world in which the centrality of experience is the chief feature; wherein all merely concrete experiences are reduced to possibilities—experienced, that is, only in their becoming and passing away.

AVATĀRANIKĀ TO A NEW TRANSLATION OF
ŚĀNTARASAPRAKARAṆA

Believing indeed that the understanding of *śānta* rasa is central to an understanding of Abhinavagupta's thought, and that the widely available translation by Masson and Patwardhan on many crucial points is misleading or incomplete,⁵² I offer as my contribution to

⁴⁸ Perhaps the final symbol of the convergence of the aesthetic and practical modes. See also S. Visuvalingam's recent study: *Abhinavagupta's Conception of Humor* (Albany, 1987).

⁴⁹ See Philip Wheelwright, "The Semantics of Poetry," *Kenyon Review* 2 (1940): 263–83, and, in general, the discussion of metaphor in Wellek and Warren, *Theory of Literature* (2nd ed., New York, 1956), 175ff. (ch. 15).

⁵⁰ A position the Indians would not find troublesome.

⁵¹ These terms suggest Hegel's *für sich sein* and *an und für sich sein*. Contemplation that grasps that it (contemplation) is the central fact of being.

⁵² The authors have frequently indicated their puzzlement, and have occasionally thrown up their hands in dismay. Just one line of the text, however, is essentially corrupt, by Raghavan's judgment (*The Number of Rasas* [Adyar, 1940], 100). The rest will, if it is approached with the right set of expectations, yield a most adequate meaning. I follow V. Raghavan's

the discussion this new translation. Masson and Patwardhan, I am convinced, were frequently wide of the mark not because of any lack of philological sophistication, but because they had prejudged the text in one crucial respect: they saw it as an essentially philosophical or metaphysical defense of the notion of *śānta* rasa. The text is indeed highly abstract and thoroughly argued; but in my view, its chief aim is to defend the aesthetic adequacy of the notion—that is, to argue the place of this *rasa* among the *rasas*. Abhinava never (to my knowledge) addresses directly the question of *śānta* rasa and *mokṣa*, or tries to defend *śānta* rasa in terms of his understanding of *mokṣa*.⁵³ The latter issue he has taken up for consideration in his later work—where his debt to his aesthetics is obvious, but again, where poetic issues figure as illuminating asides, never as conceptual bases. We are left to draw our own conclusions, and mine have been indicated above.

While taking issue with Masson and Patwardhan, I must acknowledge my (I think obvious) indebtedness to their work. Abhinava's text is immensely difficult; Abhinava's successors and copyists had as much difficulty with it as we do. The process of understanding Abhinava is essentially dialectical, and Masson and Patwardhan, by making the most difficult first step, have made the rest, if not easy, at least easier. My own ideas have often taken shape in reaction to theirs. So let not my frequent quibbles with their results obscure the respect I have for the effort they have made. The differences I have indicated are intended to highlight fundamental disagreements about the force of the text. And also to point out where I think I have been able to clarify what for them was obscure. But with Abhinava, one never knows.

I have translated all significant technical terms—with the major exception of *rasa*. Translators often take refuge in non-translation either to hide their insecurity,

edition (as did Masson and Patwardhan, for the most part), published in *Number*, 91–106.

⁵³ In one passage, at least, of the *I.P.V.*, Abhinava refers explicitly to the *rasas*—and to *śānta* rasa—but enigmatically, and without implying the distinction that occupies him in the *śāntarasaprakaraṇa* here translated: "... tathā antaḥkaraṇagocarībhūtā api iti ko viśeṣaḥ | sukhaduḥkhaprāyās tu bharatādyuktārūpāḥ sthāyivyabhicārūrūpā ratinirvedādayo 'ntaḥkaraṇaigogocarībhūtā bahirātmanā bhānti..." (*I.P.V.* ad 1.8.9 [vol. 1, pp. 419–20]). The realm of *rasa* is inner immediacy, just as immediate as that of the "outer"—but manifesting perhaps the essentially reflective immediacy that, with cultivation, will enable us also to overcome the more obdurate exterior immediacy—that does not appear as "reflective."

or (which is worse) to make the text appear more accurate and technical than it is.⁵⁴ The net result is a translation that no one can read except those who don't need to. And one slides easily into the false security of the Sanskrit, which now has become a jargon that exists entirely aside from normal communicative language. Thus it is easy to forget that *sthāyibhāva* always meant something to Abhinava. Whether my translation 'stable emotional base' is correct or not, at least the reader will have to grapple with a text that not only comments on the Sanskrit, but demands to be made sense of as an argument—just as Abhinava intended.

The style, at least, of Abhinava's *Vimarśinīs* often calls attention to his earlier speculations on poetics. Many similarities in his use of language are apparent; many metaphors are common to the two enterprises. Striking is his use of *bhitti* 'wall' in similar contexts, to call attention to the Self or *ātman* in its function as stable background on which the images of the emotions, and of real objects, are cast.⁵⁵ The "mirror" metaphor as well, indicates the limitations of the "wall" metaphor—for in the last analysis there is no "external" source of projection, as there is in the case of the mirror.⁵⁶

The image of the dancer recalls the same usage in the *Sāmkhyakārikā*.⁵⁷ But references to the "beloved" show how easily Abhinava relies on *rasasāstra*, and, for emphasis, among the *rasas*, on the erotic.⁵⁸ The crucial poetic term *camatkāra*, 'striking, vivid', occurs with "striking" effect in a discussion of the supreme consciousness.⁵⁹ Terms such as *uparāga* and *uparāñjaka*—

though they probably have the status of frozen metaphors—occur frequently in description of the relation between the transient multiplicity (of emotions, of consciousness-contents: *vikalpa*) and the "stable background" (the *ātman*).⁶⁰ The interesting term *viśrānti* is, of course, ubiquitous in both periods of writing.⁶¹ It denotes the "repose," which is perhaps not the "nature," but is at least the token, of the Self.⁶² Its absence marks all that is "insentient" [*jaḍa*].⁶³ It is a term that affects all cognitive activity—as when a word or a proposition "comes to rest" in complete understanding.⁶⁴ For Abhinava, perhaps, it is the key operational term expressing his notion that the universe is a correspondence of two realms: truth is thus also a *viśrānti*.⁶⁵

THE SECTION ON ŚĀNTARASA FROM ABHINAVAGUPTA'S
COMMENTARY ON THE NĀTYAŚĀSTRA OF BHARATAMUNI

The nature of "tranquillity" (ought also) to be stated, in the view of those who, on the other hand, read "nine *rasas*."⁶⁶ Some (of them) say that tranquillity (is the *rasa*) whose stable emotional basis [*sthāyibhāva*] is "peace" [*śama*], that it is produced by conditional factors [*vibhāva*] such as ascetic practice, association with ascetics, etc., that it is portrayed through consequential factors [*anubhāva*] such as the absence of desire and anger, and that its transitory (affective states)

⁵⁴ This is one of the flaws of Masson's and Patwardhan's translations generally.

⁵⁵ Supra, n. 17. Also see *I.P.V.* ad 1.8.1 (vol. 1, p. 401); ad 1.5.13 (vol. 1, p. 253).

⁵⁶ Supra, n. 37. Also see *I.P.V.* ad 2.1.8 (vol. 2, p. 27), and ad 1.8.11 (vol. 1, p. 423).

⁵⁷ "... tatrāpi kvacit ābhāse pramātṛṇ ekikaroti nitambinīṅṭta iva prekṣakān" (*I.P.V.* ad 1.5.10 [vol. 1, p. 239]); *S.K.* 59.

⁵⁸ "sā hi arthakriyā ābhāsabhedaniyatā | tathā ca kāntābhāsasya bāhyatve 'pi sati ābhāsāntarasya ālīnganalakṣaṇasya vyapagame dūrībhavati, iyam iti ca ābhāsāntarasya upagame 'nyaiva prakṛtanāhlādaviparītā dṛśyate arthakriyā" (*I.P.V.* ad 1.8.6 [vol. 1, p. 414]; also ad 1.8.5, etc.). The simile seems unmotivated, except as providing vividness.

⁵⁹ "... tasyāḥ (citikriyāyāḥ) pratyavamarśaḥ svātmacamatkāralakṣaṇa atmāsvabhāvaḥ | tathā hi ghaṭena svātmani na camatkriyate, svātmā na parāmrśyate, na svātmani tena prakāśyate . . . | caitreṇa tu svātmani aham iti saṅrambhodyogollāsavibhūtiyogāt camatkriyate, svātmā parāmrśyate, svātmany eva prakāśyate" (*I.P.V.* ad 1.5.13 [vol. 1, pp. 250–51]).

⁶⁰ Compare *I.P.V.* ad 1.8.5 (p. 409); ad 1.8.11 (p. 422); . . . *viṣayoparāgamahimnā* . . . , 423); with *N.Ś.* (G.O.S. ed.) p. 337: . . . *yat kālūṣyoparāgaviśeṣā evātmano ratyādayah.*

⁶¹ Cf. *I.P.V.* ad 1.4 passim, esp. *kārikās* 5 and 6.

⁶² "tathā parāmarśanam eva ajādyajīvitam . . . svāntantryārūpaṁ svābhāvīkam avabhāsasya svātmaviśrāntilakṣaṇam ananyamukhaprekṣitvaṁ nāma" (*I.P.V.* ad 1.5.11 [vol. 1, pp. 242–43]).

⁶³ ". . . nirvimarśatvāt jaḍam" (ibid.).

⁶⁴ ". . . iti asmadarthaviśrāntiḥ" (*I.P.V.* ad 1.5.17 [vol. 1, p. 276]); "yata īśvara ity api parāmarśaḥ sa īśanaśīle jñāṭṭvakartṛtvatattve viśrāmyati" (ibid., p. 275).

⁶⁵ See also n. 180, below.

⁶⁶ The reference is to *Nātya Śāstra* 6.15, which in the traditional reading, states the standard eight *rasas*:

śṛṅgārahāsyakarūṇā raudravirabhayānakāḥ |
bībhatsādbhutasamjñau cety aṣṭau nāṭye rasāḥ smṛtāḥ ||

These terms, in Sanskrit, are sometimes nouns, sometimes adjectives; remembering that *rasa* is a term that means 'taste,' 'flavor,' or 'sentiment,' the names of the various *rasas* should doubtless be taken as descriptive adjectives: the "heroic" sentiment, etc.—or their appropriate abstractions: "heroism" (as a kind of sentiment). So "tranquillity."

[*vyabhicāri*(*bhāvā*)] are steadfastness [*dhṛti*], reflection [*mati*], etc.⁶⁷

This (view) others do not tolerate, because “tranquillity” and “peace” are synonyms.⁶⁸ And also because the (traditional) number of affective states [*bhāva*] is given as forty-nine.⁶⁹ Moreover, (they say) it is entirely proper, for example, that conditional factors such as seasons and garlands are distinctly apprehended [*anusamdhīyate*] (as elements) within the erotic (*rasa*)—which comes into being immediately after their (apprehension); (but) ascetic (practices) and Vedic study (which are alleged to be among the conditional factors of *śānta*) are not immediate causes of (the *rasa*) tranquillity.⁷⁰ If it be proposed that they *are* the immediate causes of the knowledge of the truth [*tattvajñāna*]⁷¹ (which in turn occasions tranquillity), (these others reply:) in that case, effectiveness [*prayojyatā*] is attributed to the knowledge of the truth that has arisen (immediately) prior (to *śānta* *rasa*); consequently ascetic practice, Vedic study, etc., have (in effect) been given up as the conditional factors (which directly produce *śānta* *rasa*).⁷² Furthermore, the “absence of desire,” and so on, is not a consequential factor (appropriate to the portrayal of this *rasa*), because it is often in evidence when the very opposite⁷³ of tranquillity (is

being portrayed); because (in itself) it conveys nothing;⁷⁴ and because it is not something that can be suitably represented on the stage [*prayogāsamavāyivāt*]. For the cessation of activity is not a suitable subject for stage presentation. Even (conditions) such as sleep, delirium, and the like, are given consequential representation [*anubhāvante*] by actions such as regular breathing,⁷⁵ sighing, falling down, and lying on the ground. And (as for this *rasa*’s supposed transitory affective states) how can such things as “steadfastness,” in which a passion for (attainable) objects is presumed,⁷⁶ occur in (the context of) tranquillity (which, by definition, involves no passion for any object). It is not by doing nothing that the spiritual trainee [*vineya*] is educated in the means of knowing the truth;⁷⁷ they whose minds are pained at (the spectacle of) another’s pain have not reached the condition of seeing correctly, but are (still) in worldly travail (*samsāra*). Thus, “tranquillity” is not a *rasa*.

the term to be proven (*sādhya*) is never observed: e.g., a “lake,” in the case of “is on fire.” The *pakṣa*, of course, is the mountain, etc. Abhinava means then quite directly what Masson and Patwardhan propose after considerable contortion: because the “absence of desire” is often observed where *śānta* *rasa* is impossible (for instance, in the *hāsya* *rasa*), it cannot be considered an *anubhāva* of *śānta*.

⁷⁴ Masson and Patwardhan do not appear to have translated this term (*agamakatvāt*); the idea is that the “absence” of an emotion does not convey an affective response in the same way the presence of an emotion does. The “absence” of one emotion, perhaps, is the same as the absence of any other . . .

⁷⁵ Lit., ‘breathing out’ (*nīhśvāsa*) and ‘breathing in’ (*ucchvāsa*).

⁷⁶ The compound *prāptaviṣayaparāgḥ* I take to be a *bahuvrīhi* with a *tatpuruṣa* as final member. *Prāpta*, it seems to me, is intended here in its *śāstraic* sense of ‘patent, presumed.’ “*prāptasya punar upadeśe na kiñcit prayojanam asti*” (Kumārila ad *P.M.S.* 10.8.40). “Steadfastness,” in other words, is usually seen in cases of determined pursuit of objects, goals, etc. But (in this *pakṣa* at least) *śānta* cannot be thought of as “goal-oriented.” Masson and Patwardhan (*ŚAPA*, 121, note) take *prāpta* with *viṣaya* (as in the unusual grammatical compound *prāptodakaḥ* [*grāmaḥ?*]—*yaṁ grāmaṁ prāptam udakam, sa prāptodako grāmaḥ*). But as the example shows, what is “reached” (the direct object) is the extrinsic head (the “village”), not the term in agreement (“water”). Pandit Srinivasa Sastri’s explanation (though it does not seem to have been understood by Masson and Patwardhan as we have done) is doubtless the correct one.

⁷⁷ This directed at the thesis that if “absence of passion” does not produce the *rasa*, at least it may produce the intermediate condition: *tattvajñāna*.

⁶⁷ The argument so summarily here stated follows closely Bharata’s outline of *śānta* *rasa* (G.O.S. ed., vol. 1, pp. 332–33), and is intended as a reply to an opponent’s view that *śānta* is *not* a *rasa*, because it has no *sthāyin*, and cannot be produced, or portrayed. See the following discussion. The terms *vibhāva* and *anubhāva* are part of the technical vocabulary of the *nāṭyaśāstra*, and designate (roughly) the ‘conditions’ which a particular *rasa* presumes (and which, being in evidence, will be sufficient to provoke that *rasa*), and the ‘resultant manifestations’ of that *rasa*—such consequential behavior as is suitably associated with that *rasa* as its expression. E.g., for the erotic: “moonlit nights” and a “distracted air.”

⁶⁸ I.e., no proper *sthāyin* has been named.

⁶⁹ I.e., *śama* is not mentioned by Bharata among either the *sthāyibhāvas* (8), the *sātvikabhāvas* (8), or the *vyabhicāribhāvas* (33).

⁷⁰ I.e., the sense of tranquillity does not arise immediately after witnessing them, but (see next) only after some intermediate event.

⁷¹ The first occurrence here of this crucial term.

⁷² Implied in this argument is the view that the *vibhāvas* are *immediate* preconditions of the *rasa* with which they are associated.

⁷³ The note of Masson and Patwardhan to this term [*vipakṣāṭi*] (*ŚAPA*, 121) is unnecessarily confused. *Vipakṣa* here has its logical sense of ‘the anti-locus,’ that is, the domain where

To this, (it is reasonable) to respond (*atrocyate*):⁷⁸ just as now the triad (of human goals, namely) religious duty, (well-being, and pleasure) is here⁷⁹ (well known), equally well established is (the fourth) goal, viz., “liberation,” (which) has been expounded (*vyutpādyate*) primarily in the śāstras, and in traditional religious [*smṛti*] and epic [*itihāsa*] texts, (whose study serves) as means (to its attainment). But (those who insist that mokṣa is not suitable to kāvya) should be asked: why may not the state of mind [*cittavṛtti*] conducive to “liberation,” the highest human goal, not also be capable of transformation into rasa [*kimiti rasatvaṃ nāniyate*]?⁸⁰—just as those states of mind associated with pleasure, (which are) called “sexual passion,” etc., are indeed transformed into rasa, as the “erotic”—for an audience suitably endowed with a sympathetic sensibility [*hrdayasaṃvāda*], and through the agency of poet and actor—means whereby (the states) are brought to a condition capable of being enjoyed.⁸¹

That state of mind which is so (capable of transformation) is nothing but the stable emotional basis [*sthāyibhāva*] (of the rasa in question: śānta). The question is now posed: what is its name?⁸² Some assert: (it is the)

⁷⁸ The use of an impersonal passive leaves us in some doubt as to whether the view presented here may be strictly identified as Abhinava's position. But of course it is not unusual for classical authors to seek an impersonal mode of expression. Abhinava, too, rarely rejects *in toto* the views of his interlocutors.

⁷⁹ *iha* probably refers to the world of kāvya: belles-lettres—rather than (as Masson and Patwardhan), ‘in this world.’ The context of the sentence supports this. It would be odd for Abhinava to take so historicistic a stance as Masson and Patwardhan suggest (*ŚAPA*, 122, note); rather Abhinava is probably stipulating the accepted fact that the triad *is* the staple of kāvya; the fourth *puruṣārtha*, however, though equally well known, is *not* well established in kāvya, but is attested in the other genres, of which he names three.

⁸⁰ I.e., why may they not be capable of being expressed as rasa?

⁸¹ The rasa, of course, is always pleasurable, even though the raw emotional state on which it is based is not always so. The play, in general, is seen as means to that transmutation into “bliss.” Abhinava's point is that, qua *cittavṛtti*, nothing *prima facie* excludes the fourth *puruṣārtha* from this rasa-transformation.

⁸² The argument so far, as can be seen, is by indirection: *if* the *puruṣārthas* are parallel in other respects, why not in respect of rasa? But *if* so, then what shall we call the bhāva thereby implied? (All rasas must have an emotional basis.) I don't think Abhinava has declared his view yet.

“indifference” [*nirveda*] which arises from knowledge of the truth.⁸³ Indeed (they continue:) this “indifference” is different from the “indifference”⁸⁴ which arises from poverty, etc., because the cause (of the former), knowledge of the truth, is different. It is for this reason that (Bharata) reads this (term at the juncture) between the (list of) stable emotions and the (list of) transitory affective states [*sthāyisañcārimadhye*].⁸⁵ Otherwise, the sage, who always has his eye on the auspicious (utterance), would never have read (the verses) so.⁸⁶ And when he denies that “disgust” [*jugupsā*] (may be used) as a transitory affective state in the erotic rasa, Bharata⁸⁷ recognizes that all the (stable) emotional

⁸³ *nirveda* may mean both ‘indifference’ and ‘revulsion’; it is apparently intended in this latter sense by Bharata, who lists it as the first *vyabhicāribhāva* (6.18); the partisans of the view here presented (definitely not Abhinava's, as will be clear) have apparently sought to kill two birds with one stone: they discover a *sthāyin* suitable to śānta, but one that is mentioned in Bharata. Thus they have a “new” bhāva without violating the 49-bhāva limit! By adding the discrimination: *tatvajñānothita*, the sense of *nirveda* is restricted to the former of the two senses. Gary Tubb [personal communication] has suggested for *nirveda* the translation ‘disillusionment’—which is fine, provided the specifically ethical (and Indian) shading of the term is stipulated: that sense of futility following upon the recognition of the transiency of all attainments, and leading to the desire for liberation.

⁸⁴ See preceding note. “Revulsion” is here meant. In what follows, the tendency will be to discriminate this “worldly” [*laukika*] sense of *nirveda* from the other (ipso facto) *alaukika* sense. “Revulsion” involves a surfeit of emotion; “indifference,” none.

⁸⁵ The (*sthāyi*)bhāvas are given in 6.17; the *vyabhicāribhāvas* in 6.18–21. *Nirveda* is the first *vyabhicārin* listed. The defender of this view is alleging that *nirveda* may be read as the last *sthāyin* (in one sense), or the first *vyabhicārin* (in the other).

⁸⁶ I.e., if *nirveda* were intended only in the second—in-auspicious—sense (viz., ‘loathing’) it would never have been mentioned first (the auspicious position) among the *vyabhicārins*. Masson and Patwardhan regard this as a “weak argument” (*ŚAPA*, 123, note), but indeed among Indian interpreters of canonical texts, it figures as a very powerful one. Cf. the grammarians' *jñāpaka*. (This is “authorial” intention authenticated!)

⁸⁷ *jugupsā* is given as the *sthāyibhāva* of the rasa *bībhāsa* ‘the fearsome’; yet Bharata (text 6.45/46: [G.O.S. ed., p. 306]) denies its use as a *vyabhicārin* in *śrṅgāra*. The clear implication is that he views the *sthāyibhāvas* as “stable” in relation to their primary rasa, but, in relation to others (where they may also occur), as “transitory.” The category is thus relative, and not absolute.

states⁸⁸ may figure (sometimes) as primary, (sometimes) as ancillary, and (even) as involuntary⁸⁹ or (voluntary) consequential factors⁹⁰—inserted (in the play) as suitability (demands), and brought out by circumstances or by language. Now the “indifference” which arises from knowledge of the truth suppresses all the other stable emotions.⁹¹ Would not that stable (emotion), which is

⁸⁸ The text reads ambiguously: *bhāvānām sarveṣām eva*. Masson and Patwardhan take this to refer literally to “all the bhāvas”—the *sthāyi-*, *vyabhicāri-*, *sāttvika-*, and *anubhāvas*—which would make the statement appear to say that any one of them can become any other of them—circumstances demanding. They adduce a passage in the *Locana* (pp. 174–75, N.S.P. ed.) in support of Abhinava’s acceptance of this view. But that passage, like this one, is clearly labelled as a representation of an alternative standpoint (. . . *iti kecid vyācacaḥṣire*), and the text does not unambiguously support even the broad interpretation they give it. The statement of Ānandavardhana’s on which the comment is made (*etac ca sarvaṁ yeṣāṁ raso rasāntarasya*. . .) asserts only the view that one *rasa* may be *vyabhicārin* to another, and the question seems to be whether the other “*rasa*” really means ‘*rasa*,’ or (as the others believe) ‘*bhāva*.’ In our present case as well, the passage makes perfect sense as referring only to the supposed “stable” *bhāvas*—the question then being whether they must always be “stable” or may also function as transitory *bhāvas*. It is hard enough to conceive what Abhinava may mean by suggesting that the stable *bhāva* may become as well an *anubhāva* or even a *sāttvika* *bhāva* (see next), without making him say that *sāttvika* *bhāvas* and *anubhāvas* (to say nothing of the 33 *vyabhicārins*) may become stable *bhāvas*! That would imply that there should be a *rasa* corresponding to the transitory *bhāva maraṇa* ‘death!’

⁸⁹ *cittaja* is a synonym for *sāttvika(bhāva)*—a special kind of *anubhāva* which appears to be differentiated from the general class only because it is (normally) involuntary, and thus not easily simulated on the stage—sweating and horripilation are examples (*N.Ś.* 6.22). According to R. K. Sen, the *sāttvika* *bhāvas* are also signs of the veracity of the *rasa* experience in the spectator (*Aesthetic Enjoyment* [Calcutta, 1966], 264ff.). He traces their discussion (and much else relevant to the *rasa* theory) back to the medical literature. See esp. his treatment of *nirveda* [pp. 295–300].

⁹⁰ If this text is genuine, it represents a point of view not otherwise advanced (as far as I know) by anyone, including Abhinavagupta. Whether the *sthāyin* may assume the character of a *vyabhicāribhāva* is of course another matter. But it is hard to see what Abhinava may mean by allowing a stable emotion (such as “sexual passion,” or the present “disgust”) the status of an involuntary bodily reflex!

⁹¹ Masson and Patwardhan are puzzled by this statement, but surely it is the capstone of the position being advanced here,

stable by nature, truly suppress the others—in contrast with sexual passion, etc., which thrive on the variety of emotions [*bhāva*]?

This (position) must be investigated.⁹² He who asserts that indifference born of knowledge of the truth is the stable emotional basis (of the *rasa* “tranquillity”) in effect asserts that knowledge of the truth (is the stable basis of the *rasa* “tranquillity”).⁹³ How can (activities such as ascetic practice, association with yogins, Vedic study, etc., which) bear the seeds of detachment [viz., eventuate in detachment: *vairāgyasabijādiṣu*], be understood as conditional factors (to this “indifference”)? If it is maintained that they promote it, such a usage would attribute “conditionality” to the cause of a cause, and this extends (the notion of “conditional factor”) beyond is accepted range.⁹⁴ Now, “indifference,” which ever consists in an attitude that (such and such) is not to be sought after, may be defined as “detachment”—and it, on the contrary, is helpful to knowing the truth.⁹⁵ For the detached person always strives so that in himself knowledge of the truth arises—indeed it is from knowledge of the truth that liberation (comes); it is not that first knowing the truth he then becomes indifferent, and from indifference (arises) liberation. For these gentlemen agree that “from detachment comes emergence into material nature.”⁹⁶

which begins with the observation that there is a *bhāva* (viz., *nirveda*) that may be both *sthāyin* and *samcārin*, proceeds with the observation that Bharata allows this flexibility to all the (*sthāyi-*) *bhāvas*, and now concludes with the clincher that this one is so potent as to supersede the others (which, in relation to it, are “by nature” transient!). What the text means then, is only that *nirveda* must be the *sthāyin*, whenever it figures in the context of the other *bhāvas*, not that it “cannot . . . tolerate the presence” of the others (*ŚAPA*, 124, note).

⁹² This “investigation” is directed at the position stated, not by those holding the position (“They also raise the following objection . . .,” *ŚAPA*, 124).

⁹³ Masson and Patwardhan take this as an objection. It is, in fact, Abhinava’s position.

⁹⁴ The model Abhinava is anticipating here is, in fact, the reverse causal chain: *nirveda* causes *tattvajñāna*. So if it is asserted that a certain *vibhāva* (say, detachment) causes *nirveda*, it will not be the *vibhāva* of *tattvajñāna*. *Nirveda* itself is (as Abhinava will say) the *vibhāva*. One *vibhāva* does not condition another, in normal usage.

⁹⁵ The reverse had been maintained by the opponent: “knowing the truth” was the source of “indifference.”

⁹⁶ *Sāmkhyakārikā* 45. This implies that the position Abhinava is here examining is held by some or all Sāmkhyas. Indeed, the Sāmkhyas hold that *tattvajñāna* is alone the cause of

It if be countered that the detachment of him who knows the truth always becomes stronger—for even these gentlemen say, “and beyond (even) that [viz., *vairāgya*] is the absence of appetite, which proceeds from knowledge of the spiritual essence [*puruṣa*]”⁹⁷—(we reply:) let that be so; (but) the revered Patañjali himself has stated: “this type of detachment is the final state of knowledge.”⁹⁸ And so, (even on this view, we find) a series of (progressively more adequate) knowledges of the truth (each one) furthering the next; (we still discover) no “indifference” as stable basis (for liberation).⁹⁹ The only stable basis would be knowledge of the truth itself.¹⁰⁰

As for the “correct knowledge” [*saṃyagjñāna*] which, as we will explain in our commentary on the transitory affective (states), tends to the cessation of what had for a long time been sought in erroneous deception¹⁰¹—that (alone) may be taken as a conditional

liberation, and this *kārika* explains that even detachment (without it) results in a return to *samsāra*. By conflating *nirveda* with the *vairāgya* of the Sāṃkhya, Abhinava makes his opponents agree with his view—that *nirveda* is not the immediate cause (and therefore the *sthāyin*) of *mokṣa/sānta*. Suddenly, the ambiguity between *sānta* and *mokṣa* has become acute.

⁹⁷ *Yogasūtra* 1.16. Abhinava seems not to distinguish here the Sāṃkhya and Yoga darśanas, referring to partisans of both as *tatrabhavantah*.

⁹⁸ As Masson and Patwardhan point out, this quote (approximately) appears in Vyāsa's gloss ad *Y.S.* 1.16 (“*jñānasyaiva parā kāṣṭhā vairāgyam*”), but Abhinava attributes it to Patañjali himself (using an attribute “whose lord is the serpent” that usually belongs to the *Vaiyākaraṇa* Patañjali—which implies also that Abhinava thought the two Patañjalis one). The first confusion is more curious than the second.

⁹⁹ Throughout this passage, which we take to be a Sāṃkhya view, no distinction seems to be drawn between *sānta* and *mokṣa*. It is on this ground alone not Abhinava's final position. Similarly, the terms *sthāyin* and *hetu* are used, if not synonymously, at least interchangeably.

¹⁰⁰ Masson and Patwardhan (*ŚAPA*, 125, note) take this as “Abhinava's own position,” but are puzzled by the optative *bhavet*. If I am right in seeing here a Sāṃkhya thesis under examination, there is no problem: Abhinava is saying somewhat magnanimously: even they would have to accept this view—which (indeed) is close to my view! He has not yet announced his own position, but this argument does anticipate it: *tattvajñāna* will be an essential element, but not the entirety.

¹⁰¹ I.e., because of a deception based on a mistaken judgment. This mundane “knowledge” is of course not the *tattvajñāna* which results from the cessation of a transcendental error. See nn. 83 and 84, above.

factor to “indifference,” (but “indifference” in this sense amounts to) “revulsion” [*kheda*]. For example:

Useless—milking a bull
that I had taken for a cow heavy with udder!
Useless—embracing a eunuch
that I had taken for a lovely girl!
I hoped for beryl
when I saw the piece of glass shining!
O foolish me who worshipped
miserable you! worthless and unsophisticated!

We will (further) explain this (mundane indifference) at that time.¹⁰²

But has the revered Akṣapāda¹⁰³ not asserted, in the aphorism beginning “the source of suffering . . .,” that the predilection for objects of sense, which has its root in false knowledge, is quieted by knowledge of the truth? (This implies, does it not, that) knowledge of the truth—which destroys false knowledge, is the cause of detachment—defined as the falling away of (such) defects (as false knowledge)?

If so, what of it?

Well, isn't “indifference” [*nirveda*] (a form of) “detachment” [*vairāgya*]?¹⁰⁴

Who asserts such (a proposition)? “Indifference” (after all) is a mental state characterized by an *effusion* of the current of grief; “detachment” is the *cessation* of passions and the like.

Or, let us assume (for the purposes of argument) that “indifference” is (a kind of) “detachment.”¹⁰⁵ Still, the teacher did not include it in the aphorism, understanding that liberation was (the effect thereby) to be accomplished, because, even though it would have come between (cause and effect), it is under the control of its own cause.¹⁰⁶ He would, rather, on the ground that

¹⁰² Presumably, in the commentary on *N.Ś.* 7 (the *bhāvaprakaraṇa*), now lost, except for a short section at the beginning.

¹⁰³ Gautama. The reference is to *Nyāyasūtra* 1.2. The Sāṃkhya here defends the view that indifference may be the effect of knowledge (as cause).

¹⁰⁴ The point is not that they are “the same thing” (*ŚAPA*, 127, note), but that *nirveda* belongs to the genus *vairāgya*—hence falls under the scope of the *sūtra* cited. The net effect would be to salvage *nirveda* as a possible *sthāyin* of *sānta*.

¹⁰⁵ We are still attempting to ascertain the purport of *N.S.* 1.2. The two pakṣas considered appear to be based on the two senses of *nirveda*. See above, nn. 83, 84 and 101.

¹⁰⁶ Viz., *tattvajñāna* [*N.S.* 1.1]. If we accept the view that *vairāgya* cum *nirveda* is a consequence of *tattvajñāna*, we

indifference arises from knowledge of the truth, have used the term “indifference” (in the aphorism) instead of “peace” [*śama*]. The terms “peace” and “tranquillity” have been understood (here) as synonyms—just as are “laughter” [*hāsa*] and the “comic (rasa)” [*hāsyā*]; their difference can (also) easily be stated (as it has been in our own aesthetics) in terms of the relation between the given and that which is to be realized, or that between the mundane and the transcendental, or between the common and the special.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, “indifference” is not the stable (emotional basis of “tranquillity”).¹⁰⁸

will simply have adduced an intermediate cause between *tattvajñāna* and mokṣa—the ultimate effect in the causal chain. Abhinava explains that it is for this reason that *vairāgya* was not mentioned in the sūtra—even if it be regarded as a consequence; the operative cause of mokṣa is still *tattvajñāna*; *vairāgya* is only an intermediate condition—something like the stick between the potter’s hand and the pot. Masson and Patwardhan have translated *svakāraṇavaśāt* loosely (or not at all?); *sva* must refer, not to *mokṣa*, but to *nirveda*.

¹⁰⁷ Masson and Patwardhan (*ŚAPA*, 127–28, note) have, I think, misunderstood this passage. It is not, as they aver, the siddhāntin’s position, but continues the indirect argument against those Naiyāyikas who assert *nirveda* as the *sthāyin* of *śānta* rasa. The difficulties alleged disappear when it is remembered that Bharata (in the probably spurious *śānta-rasaprakaraṇa*) has mentioned *śama* as the *sthāyi* of *śānta* (see above, note 67); it is this view that those who adduce *nirveda* are attempting to rescue (supra, notes 68, 83). Abhinava is here saying simply that if this *nirveda* had been intended by Gautama as a proximate cause of mokṣa (and hence a possible *sthāyin* of *śānta*), he could hardly have failed to mention it—for it would have supported the view that the *śama* mentioned by Bharata was indeed the *sthāyin*! The only stipulations that would have had to be made are that *śama* and *nirveda* be synonyms (and this is easily granted), and that *śama* and *śānta* be related as the names for *bhāva* and *rasa*—according to one of the criteria stated. The fact that Gautama did not take this straightforward route proves conclusively that he did not accept *śama* as *sthāyin*, and that those of his followers who do, are wrong. It is, of course, the case that the siddhāntin would not disagree with the view here expressed.

¹⁰⁸ It is odd, perhaps, that Abhinava dismisses with such a flourish the view that in our editions of the *śānta* rasa section seems to be Bharata’s also. V. Raghavan (*Number*, 15–16) adduces this is still another reason for considering the *śānta-rasaprakaraṇa* spurious. Certainly, the view on which Abhinava is commenting takes its major stand on *nirveda*, not on *śama*, but this may be a sign only that Bharata’s view had been by Abhinava’s time superseded. The view now attributed to Bharata is—here and at the beginning of the commentary—considered by Abhinava (c.f. n. 3, p. 35).

Still others affirm the following: eight particular mental states only have been spoken of (by Bharata)—sexual passion, etc.¹⁰⁹ They become even more variegated [*vicitra*] when (over and above the factors already mentioned) they are conjoined with special otherworldly conditional factors such as (the study of) revealed texts in solitude.¹¹⁰ One among these (extraordinary varieties) (must be) the stable (emotional basis of *śānta*). Indeed, sexual passion (itself) may be the stable (emotional basis, for) having as its object the uninterrupted, blissful Self,¹¹¹ it is the means to liberation. As has been said:

He alone has no task left to do
Whose delight is in the Self,
Who is satisfied with the Self,
Who is pleased by the Self.¹¹²

In this way, any one of the (permanent mental states), from sexual passion and laughter up to amazement¹¹³ may be posited as the stable (emotional basis of *śānta*)—insofar as liberation is achieved by him who perceives that the entire (realm of sense-)objects is incongruous [*hāsa*]; or who looks on everything as lamentable [*śoka*]; or who sees worldly affairs as offensive [*krodha*]; or who has taken refuge in a heroism both uncompromising and undeluded [*utsāha*]; or who is afraid of all sense objects [*bhaya*]; or who has conceived disgust for those things, such as young women, etc., that are sought after in the world [*jugupsā*]; or who is amazed at the extremity of the unprecedented attainment of his Self [*vismaya*].

Nor is this (view) disapproved of by the sage (Bharata). Inasmuch as he enumerates specific emotional states [*bhāva*], using terms like “sexual passion,” etc., and then incorporates others which are modes of these, using the term “and”—he acknowledges that sexual passion and the rest (also may) aim at final release [*apavargaviṣaya*], brought into play by transcendental causes that are different from those (which bring about the ordinary states listed).¹¹⁴ But those who

¹⁰⁹ Viz., the eight *sthāyibhāvas* of the eight canonical rasas.

¹¹⁰ This is perhaps not, as Masson and Patwardhan have taken it, simply a reference to upaniṣadic study, but (in keeping with the parallelism of the example) also an intentionally ambiguous reference to esoteric tantric sexual practices.

¹¹¹ I.e., the *alaukika* form of *rati*—again, a reference to the tantra.

¹¹² *Bhagavad Gītā* 3.17.

¹¹³ *vismaya* is the *sthāyin* of *adbhuta* rasa, typically the last of the eight mentioned.

¹¹⁴ *N.Ś.* 1.17 reads:

ratiś ca hāsaś ca śokaś ca krodhotsāhau bhayaṁ tathā |
jugupsā vismayaś ceti sthāyibhāvāḥ prakīrtitaḥ ||

speak thusly—who allow (the *sthāyins*) alternately to replace one another, in effect undermine the stability of (any) one.¹¹⁵ The notion contradicts itself on its face which asserts that any one [*tasya tasya*] (of the eight *bhāvas*) may become the stable (basis), depending on this or that condition.¹¹⁶ (Furthermore), because the stable (emotional basis) is different for each person, the *rasa* itself arguably would be infinite.¹¹⁷ If (in response to this, it is argued that) the *rasa* would be one, because it is the cause of a single (result, namely) liberation—then (one might as well argue that) the heroic [*vīra*] and the violent [*raudra*] (*rasas*) were one because they eventuated in a single result, namely, the destruction (of the enemy)!

Still others say that it is because sexual passion and the rest have become indistinguishable—like the flavors in a drink—that they (together constitute) the stable (emotional basis of *śānta rasa*).¹¹⁸ This also is not an attractive (thesis), because the mental states do not occur simultaneously, and because (some of them) are incompatible (with others).

What then is the stable (emotional basis of *śānta rasa*)? It is said:¹¹⁹ to the extent that knowledge of the

The several *ca* 'and' in this śloka are alleged to justify reference to *bhāvas* other than the eight named—particularly the *alaukika* forms of each that are the ground of *śānta*.

¹¹⁵ This is one of Abhinava's most telling remarks—directed against those who, despairing of fixing one *bhāva* as the *sthāyin* of *śānta*, would allow any of the *bhāvas* (alternately) as *sthāyin*, and thus not preserve the distinctiveness of any *rasa*; this applies as well to *śānta*: however unusual or differently motivated it is, it cannot be reduced to the others (or the essence of the others: see Gerow and Aklujkar, "On *Śānta Rasa*," 81).

¹¹⁶ I don't think Masson and Patwardhan have got the exact flavor of this sally. It does not claim that the *bhāvas*, on the opponent's view, "would cancel each other out"—but rather that the *notion* of *sthāyin* itself has been sacrificed, if it is made conditional on variation among the other *bhāvas*. The assertion of a conditional *sthāyin*, in fact, contradicts itself—not that it is "(as good as) already refuted" (*ŚĀPA*, 129).

¹¹⁷ I.e., even the "*śānta rasa*" which this pakṣa hopes to justify would disappear in a myriad of private "*rasas*." I agree with Masson and Patwardhan here (*ŚĀPA*, 130, note).

¹¹⁸ This view must have been intended as a reply to the deficiencies alleged in the former position. Only by mixing them up does the *sthāyin* emerge!

¹¹⁹ This I take to be Abhinava's first sketch of his *siddhānta*. The impersonal *ucyate* is not too surprising, inasmuch as the question of *tattvajñāna* has already been broached in reference to the Sāṃkhya position discussed above. The difference between that statement and this is one of modality only: there it was asserted that the (Sāṃkhya) position under discussion

truth is a means to the (accomplishment of) liberation, it is that alone that ought to be stable where liberation (is concerned).¹²⁰ But "knowledge of the truth" is nothing but knowledge of the Self—knowledge of a Self, as it were, an object apart (from mundane objects). For if the Self were indeed "beyond" [*para*], it would not be a self.¹²¹ This has been dealt with extensively by our teacher,¹²² and we also have elsewhere expatiated upon it—so we will not insist on it here.¹²³ It follows then that the Self—possessed of untainted qualities such as knowledge and joy, and untouched by affections for presumptive objects¹²⁴—is the stable (basis for *śānta*

would amount to identifying *tattvajñāna* as the *sthāyin*—if understood correctly; here that implication is taken as basis for the further statement of the *siddhāntin's* position. As we will see, it is not *tattvajñāna* as such that Abhinava accepts as *sthāyin*, but the ground of *tattvajñāna*—the *ātman*.

¹²⁰ My translation [*tasyaiva mokṣe sthāyitā yuktā*] attempts to retain the distinction (which I feel is essential to Abhinava's thesis) between the domains of art and reality. *Tattvajñāna*, if it is a means to the achievement of *mokṣa*, is also a *sthāyin* where *mokṣa* is represented. The "oddness" in the reference to *mokṣa* (*ŚĀPA*, 130, note) stems only from Masson and Patwardhan's determination to obscure this distinction.

¹²¹ *anātmāiva*: could this be a *bahuvrīhi*—'have no (mundane) self'? In other words, the Self cannot be known like external objects, and yet must, because immanent in all knowledge, be knowable! This understanding agrees with K. Bhattacharya's: "l'ātman, étant un autre (*para*), ne serait qu'un non-ātman (*anātman*)" ("*Śāntarasa* et Advaita," 90).

¹²² Perhaps Bhaṭṭa Tauta, his teacher in poetics, or Lakṣmaṇagupta, his teacher in Pratyabhijñā. Abhinava also uses the honorific plural in referring to his teacher (there doubtless Tauta) in the *Bhāratī* [G.O.S. ed., p. 274].

¹²³ Of course we cannot be sure what Abhinava intends here—the works of his teachers have not survived. But I must register my disagreement with Masson and Patwardhan who consider these obscure phrases "very clumsy." Such an imperfect judgment reveals only their determination to force a view on the words—which I have taken literally, and I think, made them say what they can. Indeed, considerations of grammar alone would rule out their translation: "The knowledge of any object other than the Self is the knowledge of worldly objects. For anything that is different from the Self is nothing but non-self." Abhinava is simply pointing out that the "Self" [*para ātmā*] exists on a different level of reality than do the mundane "selves"—and so its poetics would also involve an element of transcendence. I accept Raghavan's reading *viṣayasyeva*.

¹²⁴ *parikalpitaṣaya*: "objects" (in the mundane world) are always presented to, or postulated by the Self—they do not correspond to its "nature." Masson's and Patwardhan's "imagined" (*ŚĀPA*, 131) is too Buddhist!

rasa).¹²⁵ Its “stableness” is not to be argued in terms of the “stableness” (of the other emotive states).¹²⁶ (The other states) such as sexual passion, whose mode of existence (ever) is to be (either) facilitated or obstructed, in accordance with the appearance or disappearance of various causal factors, are said to be “stable” relatively [*āpekṣikatayā*], to the extent that they attach themselves for a time to the wall¹²⁷ of the Self, whose nature it is to be “stable.” Knowledge of the truth, however, represents the wall itself (on which are displayed) all the other emotions [*bhāvāntara*], and is (thus), among all the stable (emotive states), the most stable.¹²⁸ It need not be separately mentioned (among the *sthāyibhāvas*)¹²⁹ because it by nature is an always realized stable emotional basis, which converts all the mental states, such as sexual passion and the others, into ancillaries [*vyabhicāribhāvayan*] (of itself).¹³⁰ For the same reason, it is not proper to count it separately (as a “ninth” *bhāva*). One does not count “bovinity” a third, in addition to (the bull) with half-grown horns, and with no horns.¹³¹ Thus the figure of forty-nine, (for

¹²⁵ This, finally, is Abhinava’s *siddhānta*. Its examination will occupy the rest of the *śāntarasaprakaraṇa*.

¹²⁶ Masson’s and Patwardhan’s translation is garbled, but I think we agree on the sense.

¹²⁷ *bhitti*: is it only our Platonic upbringing that makes us hear echoes of the cave in this metaphor? Masson and Patwardhan see rather the “canvas” of the painter—which, albeit attractive, is not supported by the lexica (cf. s.v. *citrabhitti* [BR, 5:279]).

¹²⁸ It would be difficult, on the basis of this line alone, to claim that *tattvajñāna* was *not* an ‘emotive state’ [(*sthāyi*)*bhāva*]!

¹²⁹ This remark does not necessarily prove that our text “is not likely to be precisely the one that Abhinava commented upon” (*ŚAPA*, 35, and note): the fact that *tattvajñāna* has been mentioned among the *vibhāvas* of *śānta* is not germane to Abhinava’s point here.

¹³⁰ This is not as great a concession as might at first appear, for all the “stable” emotions may, on occasion, serve as “transitory” emotions to another *sthāyibhāva*. Abhinava is saying, though, that the process of conversion is here not occasional, but natural.

¹³¹ But the bull with fully developed horns would be a third! By this remark, Abhinava seems to assert that *tattvajñāna*, and by implication *śānta*, are *genera*—something like *bhāvatva* and *rasatva*. It should be remembered that his concern here is to account for Bharata’s “failure” to mention the “ninth” items. I think the point of the comparison is rather that, existing on a different level of being, they need not be “counted”

the) emotions, remains intact. If¹³² we are asked: why has it not been separately mentioned? we would reply: because it is not associated with any separable bliss.¹³³ Unlike sexual passion, and the rest, this form of the Self we have described is not, in its unalloyed form [*asamprkṣtena vapusā*], within the province of the ordinary understanding.¹³⁴ It appears, though in itself [*svagata*] not subject to any predication [*avikalparūpa*], as soiled by the other mental states,¹³⁵ when it is examined at the moment in which its permanent characteristics¹³⁶ (have been recognized).¹³⁷

Or, let it appear so in the world.¹³⁸ Nevertheless, there is no counting of stable (emotions) simply because they are possible, because such would not be

among entities they inform; they are indeed not separable from (= not opposable to) the other *rasas*, being presumed by them. Whether this makes them into Aristotelian *genera* is an open question. Note also that ‘bovinity’ [*gotva*] here is intended as the abstract universal [*sāmānya*], which on the usual Indian view, does not comprehend the individuals—and is more akin to a property [*dharma*] than what we would call a genus. Putting it on the same “counting” level as the *viśeṣa* is clearly improper.

¹³² We have established that there is no need to mention *tattvajñāna*. Now we advance a positive reason for not mentioning it.

¹³³ Abhinava means that the “blisses” associated with sex, heroism, etc., appear to be different; when one occurs, the other does not, etc. The “bliss” of the Self of course is not “separable” in this sense—but ubiquitous. The reading *āsvādayogāt* which Masson and Patwardhan prefer (contra Raghavan) is clearly a *lectio facillior*, and I see no reason to adopt it. If adopted, nevertheless, the line would refer to the 49 *bhāvas*, not to *tattvajñāna*: “why have they been separately mentioned? Because their respective blisses are discriminable. . . .”

¹³⁴ . . . answering the question: why, if it is ubiquitous, are we not constantly aware of it?

¹³⁵ . . . because these states appear to be predicated of it: “the Self experiences (sexual) joy, etc.”

¹³⁶ A *vyutthānasamskāra* is one that is not suppressed, when those that are suppressible are: see *Y.S.* 3.9. Normally, such *samskāras* are cognized only during meditation, etc.

¹³⁷ This accounts for the “appearance” of the Self, seemingly as transitory, and as associated with the other states of consciousness. But it is not for these reasons to be “counted separately.”

¹³⁸ This is not really a “concession” on Abhinava’s part. It is simply a restatement of the implication of the preceding conclusion. The *ātman* does appear so in the world—whatever it may be really. Thus there is no reason to attribute that conclusion to a “*pūrvapakṣin*” (*ŚAPA*, 131, note).

useful given the rasas that have been declared.¹³⁹ But rather they would have been defined (simply) as transitory (emotions)—and not otherwise.¹⁴⁰ Thus (again) the version is sound (which accepts) forty-nine emotional states.

Now, further, the nature of the Self does not admit of transitoriness—because this is impossible,¹⁴¹ and because (the Self) does not convey diversity [*vaicitrya*],¹⁴² and because (even if such a Self were possible, it would) not be suitable (to dramatic representation).¹⁴³ The “nature of the Self” is (indeed) “peace”—and the sage (Bharata) has indicated this (nature) by using the term “peace.”¹⁴⁴ Whether he indicates this by using the term “peace,” or the term “indifference,” does not compromise (our position).¹⁴⁵ Only (it appears) that “peace” is one mental state, “indifference” another; (the latter) is akin to the (mundane) “indifference” that arises from other conditional factors, such as poverty, etc. Being kin (to that other state) it may be designated by the term for it, even though there is a difference of cause—as are sexual passion, fear, etc.¹⁴⁶ And so, “peace” (*mutatis mutandis*) is nothing but this “nature

of the Self”—viz., knowledge of the truth.¹⁴⁷ Moreover [*tathā ca*], sexual passion and the rest are specific (forms) of affection which stain the Self; even though it is accompanied by them, (he who), by dint of uninterrupted meditation, understands its pure form, (achieves their) pacification as soon as its permanent characteristics (have been recognized).¹⁴⁸ It is said: “(Its) pacification is conveyed by (suppression of the antagonistic) affections.”¹⁴⁹ Before the stable (affective state), knowledge of the truth, the entire group of mental states, both mundane and transcendental, becomes “transitory.” (They become) its consequential factors [*tadanubhāvā eva*], together with the consequential factors that are aided by abstinence and suppression,¹⁵⁰ and those natural gestures that will be explained in the three chapters beginning with “glances . . .”¹⁵¹ Thus

term *tadvyapadeśya*—Patañjali the grammarian’s term for metonymy. The issue is how two different things can have the same name. Now neither *rati* nor *bhaya* (which stand here for the *sthāyibhāvas* of the eight rasas), when considered from the point of view of their various causes (or, in the drama, their *vibhāvas*), appears to be a single phenomenon—and yet, because of other similarities, a single term is used. Abhinava’s point here is not only that the *laukika* and *alaukika nirveda* are called by the same term; he thereby implies (this is the main point) that any difference between the *alaukika nirveda* and *śama* may be discounted.

¹⁴⁷ The terms of the predication are reversed.

¹⁴⁸ See above, n. 137. Or: “remains in a state of utter tranquillity even after the meditative recognition (i.e., the return to normal consciousness: *vyutthāna*) is accomplished” (so Visuvalingam).

¹⁴⁹ Y.S. 3.10. Masson and Patwardhan do not translate this sūtra, and profess to see no relation between it and the preceding remark of Abhinava’s. I do not see their problem: *praśāntatā* expresses exactly Abhinava’s view that the “colorations” are essential to the experience of “tranquillity”—for it is the recognition of them as transient that leads the aspirant to a cognition of the permanent self. Throughout this section, Bharata’s *śama* is shown to imply various views consistent with Abhinava’s view that the purification of the Self is an apt theme of poetic (as well as metaphysical) discourse.

¹⁵⁰ *yamanyama*: the first two stages of Yogic discipline; see n. 21, above.

¹⁵¹ *upāṅgābhinaya*: the reference is to chs. 8–10 of the *N.Ś.* Masson and Patwardhan (*ŚAPA*, 132, note) take this sentence as a truism: “Its anubhāvas are anubhāvas. . . .” But, surely, Abhinava is here asserting the three kinds of *anubhāva* suitable to śānta: *tadanubhāvā eva* presumes its logical subject from the immediately preceding *kalāpaḥ svabhāva* I understand as a reference to the *sātvikabhāva* (supra, n. 89: *cittaja*).

¹³⁹ On the level of appearance, the *appearance* of the ātman (in meditation, etc.) would otherwise justify the separate counting of *sthāyibhāva*, etc. But as explained above, this *sthāyin* is a *sthāyin* of a different sort—not “apparent” (as are the eight bhāvas).

¹⁴⁰ And even the bhāva underlying śānta would have been “transitory”—that is, apparent.

¹⁴¹ I.e., self-contradictory. We now address the question: is this rasa capable of dramatic representation? It is interesting that this section has presented more problems to Masson and Patwardhan than any other—probably because they were determined to understand it as “philosophic” (*ŚAPA*, 130, note). The problems for the most part disappear when Abhinava’s reference is seen as the *play*.

¹⁴² Perhaps in the sense that “variety is the spice of life”—and certainly of the other transitorinesses—which are ever arising and disappearing.

¹⁴³ The view that “the Self is subject to diversity” is on its face inadmissible. I follow here Visuvalingam’s understanding of the series of *hetus enchainés* as referring to stages of aesthetic experience.

¹⁴⁴ As the *sthāyibhāva* of śānta, in the section of the text we are now commenting on. What Bharata intends by *śama* will help answer the question of the rasa’s playability.

¹⁴⁵ Referring doubtless to the dispute among the pūrvapakṣins with which the commentary began: “some say . . . ‘peace,’ others . . . ‘indifference.’” Supra, n. 67.

¹⁴⁶ Masson’s and Patwardhan’s puzzlement at this line stems perhaps from not having appreciated the implications of the

these (consequential factors) properly belong to it [*etadvīṣayā evā*].¹⁵² For this is (its) nature.¹⁵³

Similarly, (its) conditional factors are such things as the supreme Lord's grace. And (thanks) to this,¹⁵⁴ (the depiction of) sexual passion, etc., may be enjoyed as about to be extinguished. Just as (are enjoyed) longing, in (the *rasa* of) erotic separation; or the "complete festival of the beloved," in (the *rasa* of) erotic union.¹⁵⁵ And as (are enjoyed) fierceness,¹⁵⁶ in the violent *rasa*, or disinterest, steadfastness, fright or joy,¹⁵⁷ in the pitiful, heroic, fearsome, or marvellous (*rasas*). Even though these (states) are transitory, they appear as primary;¹⁵⁸ similarly, in (the *rasa*) tranquillity, (states like) disgust (may appear to be primary), because they are utterly antagonistic to passion.¹⁵⁹ And simi-

¹⁵² The problem of *śānta*'s *anubhāvas* has now been solved: they are not the "absence" of certain states (*supra*, n. 67), but may be found among three positive categories: *laukika* mental states understood as transient; *alaukika* (yogic) mental states; and among certain gestures natural to *śānta*. Again, the dramatic force of *śānta* is the issue. The question of *anubhāva*—to which the *entrée* was provided by the discussion of *śama*, above—is after all the key issue where the play's playability is met. The questions of *anubhāva* and *abhinaya* are inseparable; Bharata constantly links them.

¹⁵³ The remark seems to me to follow appropriately (*ŚAPA*, 132, note). The play is playable if it has suitable *anubhāvas*.

¹⁵⁴ The *atra* does not seem to have been picked up by Masson and Patwardhan.

¹⁵⁵ In the first case, a *vyabhicāribhāva*, in the second, an *ālamghanavibhāva*. I think Abhinava means that, as subsidiary elements, they are, though adventitious and impermanent, enjoyable—and indeed, because they are impermanent, they are enjoyed.

¹⁵⁶ A *vyabhicārin* associated with *raudra* (G.O.S., vol. 1, p. 321).

¹⁵⁷ These are variously *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* or *vyabhicāribhāvas* of the *rasas* in question. The same remark applies.

¹⁵⁸ I think Abhinava is not using these terms here in their narrow technical sense: as objects of enjoyment, these impermanent states and conditions occupy the center of our attention.

¹⁵⁹ In this passage, Abhinava stresses the similarities of *śānta*, on a dramatic level, with the other *rasas*, despite the metaphysical arguments adduced earlier which isolated it. It seems to me that the "main point" (*ŚAPA*, 133, note) of his argument is that *śānta* may be *enjoyed*—precisely because, in presentation, it employs (*a fortiori!*) the same technical means as the other *rasas*!—though one must be careful to observe that when they appear to be primary, it is just an appearance.

larly, in the Mahāvratā (rite), the wearing of human skulls . . .¹⁶⁰ The anointing of his body with (foul-smelling) oils, for the purpose of inducing disgust, is enjoined on the husband's brother, engaged in (the act of) procreating a son.¹⁶¹ His preeminent striving¹⁶² is here included within that class of acts—a synonym for which is "compassion" [*dayā*]¹⁶³—whose form is that of an effort (made to satisfy) a wish for another's welfare, in accordance with the maxim: "he who has accomplished in himself all that is to be accomplished,¹⁶³ will make an effort to achieve the aims of others." Therefore, on the strength of this¹⁶⁴ being a transitory (emotional state), some designate (these acts) as "heroism of compassion," others as "heroism of religious duty."¹⁶⁵

But this "striving" (which you have seen in various scenes suitable to the depiction of *śānta* *rasa*) is the life-breath of egoism;¹⁶⁶ "tranquillity" however consists in the relaxation of egoism.

(To this objection, we reply: no), for (the depiction of) even an antagonistic (emotive state) as transitory is not inappropriate—witness the (depiction of) indiffer-

¹⁶⁰ Abhinava's point is probably that such practices are also "antagonistic to passion." The remainder of this line is "very corrupt" and difficult to emend (Raghavan, *Number*, 100). It may refer to other tantric or yogic practices apparently "disgusting."

¹⁶¹ As in the preceding cases, "disgust" is a necessary ancillary to achieving equanimity. As Masson and Patwardhan point out (*ŚAPA*, 133, note), the begetting of children by levirate should not involve any intentional delight, but proceed from duty alone.

¹⁶² *utsāha*: the *sthāyibhāva* of *vīra* *rasa*. Even this, in the sample, is subordinated to a transcendent, and apparently emotion-free, condition. Masson and Patwardhan appear to take this statement as a general observation, not as further comment on the levirate. But I think Abhinava's point is that even such matters are within the scope of drama.

¹⁶³ I.e., who has realized in himself the Self.

¹⁶⁴ *etat*: referring, I think, to the *utsāha* of the preceding line.

¹⁶⁵ I see no evidence that it is *śānta* *rasa* that is being called *dayāvīra*, etc. (*ŚAPA*, 133)—although it is clear that such scenes will be the staple of those works emphasizing *śānta* *rasa*. In all these examples, the antinomy "energy/peace" is orchestrated in such a way as to (1) make clear that peace is the primary term; and (2) that the "attractiveness" of the scene (which none would deny) is a function of the secondary term.

¹⁶⁶ *ahamkāra*: lit., the 'I-term'. The principle of the narrow, individual "self" or Ego.

ence in (scenes of) sexual passion.¹⁶⁷ In verses such as: “My bed is the grassy lawn . . .”¹⁶⁸ the preeminence of striving in order to accomplish the welfare of others, is noticed. No (human) condition is ever devoid of striving—apart from the effort (to fulfill one’s) desires, one would be a stone! Since then they who have apprehended the lower and the higher (selves) have nothing left to accomplish in reference to their own Self—their minds now being tranquil—the sacrifice of their own body, or wealth, for the welfare of others, is not incompatible with (their) tranquillity.¹⁶⁹ The preservation of one’s body, etc., is enjoined for those who have not accomplished what is to be accomplished—in accordance with the maxim: “he should protect himself . . .”¹⁷⁰ Ascetic renouncers, however, lack any intention to preserve such (things). For example:

The life-breath is the established condition
Of religious duty, profit, desire, and liberation.
When it is gone, what is left to destroy?
When it is safe, what is not saved?¹⁷¹

The motivation [*nidāna*] for preserving the body is thus shown to be its instrumentality in achieving the four well-known aims of life. One hears, in the case of ascetic renunciation, that “he who has accomplished all should fall¹⁷² into water, into fire, into a chasm.” So, in one way or another, (the renouncer) must abandon his body. If it be abandoned for another’s sake, is there something that is not realized thereby? If it be objected

that such as Jimūtavāhana¹⁷³ were not renouncers, what difference does that make to us? Certainly he (is understood to have) possessed knowledge of the truth. Otherwise, it is inconceivable that one who equated body with self, and made (his) body into the be-all and end-all (of existence), should abandon (it) for another’s sake, without reference to religious duty, and the like. Even in battle, the hero does not strive (directly) to abandon his body; rather he acts in the interest of conquering the enemy.¹⁷⁴ So too, by throwing (one’s body) off a cliff, one hopes¹⁷⁵ rather to acquire a more resplendent body (in the next life). Whatever is done—teaching, giving of gifts, and finally the abandoning of the body—without reference to one’s own interest and for the sake of another, is wholly inconceivable on the part of those who have not acquired a knowledge of the truth of the self.¹⁷⁶ Those (who have) do know the truth. Both revealed texts and recollected authority (support the view that) in all stages of life, liberation belongs to those who are wise. As has been said:

Even the householder is liberated
Who is devoted to the service of the god,
Bases (his deeds) on knowledge of the truth,
Is kind to guests, performs the funeral rites,
And gives liberally of his substance.¹⁷⁷

It is only from (performing) religious duties that are done with the intention of helping another, and conceived in connection with the essential result of another’s welfare,¹⁷⁸ that there arises (in the next life) another body suitable to that (duty, and this is the body) of Buddhas-to-be, and as well, of those who know the truth.

¹⁶⁷ Does Abhinava have the *Śākuntala* (act 5) in mind?

¹⁶⁸ *Nāgānanda* 4.2. The discussion of this play—as a possible locus of *śānta* rasa, will now be taken up. Note that Abhinava introduces the subject with a quotation, focussing our attention on the dramatic manifestation—a quotation which incidentally marks the major transition in the play, from lovers’ intrigue (acts 1–3) to scenes of compassion and self-sacrifice (acts 4 and 5).

¹⁶⁹ Masson and Patwardhan (*ŚAPA*, 133) take this as a direct reference to *śānta* rasa. That is possible, but given the earlier reference to “tranquil” minds, not entirely clear.

¹⁷⁰ *Gautamadharmasūtra* 1.9.34 (Ānandāśrama ed., p. 63). The commentator, perhaps a New Yorker, adds: *eko na gacched adhvānam . . .*

¹⁷¹ Source unknown.

¹⁷² *patet*: viz., throw himself into . . . The root *śru* ‘hear’ and derivatives, generally indicate that the source is a revealed text. If so, this one is unidentified. Masson and Patwardhan (*ŚAPA*, 134, note) call attention to the legend of Abhinava’s entering the Bhairava cave, never to be seen again.

¹⁷³ The ascetic hero of the *Nāgānanda*. The play provides the sub-text for this entire discussion. Jimūtavāhana was a king and *vidyādharma*, not a *yati*. The objection is literal.

¹⁷⁴ Ergo, heroism of this sort is not really compatible with *śānta*: the hero of this sort is not so much abandoning his body (which could be taken as a form of asceticism), but seeking conquest: Arjuna’s very problem!

¹⁷⁵ Lit., . . . the hope gapes [*vijr̥mbhate*]. The language is also resplendent. Is Abhinava being ironic?

¹⁷⁶ A very active ethic is superimposed here by Abhinava on the Indian ideal of ascetic withdrawal. All meritorious activity is derived from *tattvajñāna*! And if this be the case, the utility of witnessing dramas and the like will not be compromised!

¹⁷⁷ Source unknown.

¹⁷⁸ Intention [*abhisam̐dhi*] and result [*phala*] are both important.

And even when (it figures properly among the) subsidiaries,¹⁷⁹ we observe that a calm [*viśrānti*] is reached, because this is also appropriate to (its own) nature.¹⁸⁰ For example—Rāma acceding to the command of his father, where (it is) subsidiary to the heroic.¹⁸¹ The same (relationship) is to be supposed in the case of the subsidiaries to the erotic and other rasas.¹⁸² Thus, even though tranquillity is stable (by the preceding argument), it may figure as secondary (in a work).¹⁸³ In the case of Jimūtavāhana, (it is so) because what is

¹⁷⁹ The prior discussion has dealt with the question of śānta as a *pradhāna* rasa. This is what is implied in the search for its *sthāyibhāva*: if such a *sthāyin* can be found, ipso facto, śānta is a possible “major” rasa in a work of art. But the rasas also frequently figure as subsidiary to another (as *pradhāna*). Ānandavardhana, in book 3 (vs. 18ff.) of the *Dhvanyāloka*, discusses the “blending” of rasas, emphasizing that the quality of the work is often a function of maintaining the primary rasa in and through its dynamic contrasts [*aucitya*]. In this section of the commentary, we take up the even thornier question of śānta as a possible “subordinate” to other rasas. This of course is the usual mode of its appearance in drama—but Abhinava’s theoretical defence of śānta makes it very difficult to see how it could possibly be subordinate to anything—its *sthāyibhāva* being, by nature, *sthāyin*, etc.

¹⁸⁰ *viśrānti* seems intended here as a synonym of *śama*, above. But since “peace” (qua “knowledge of the truth”) is the stable basis of śānta, a different term is needed to designate the “cessation” of a subsidiary rasa. The subsidiary will by its nature be appearing and disappearing—this applies to all rasas (cf. the discussion of *bhāvaśānti*, *bhāvodaya*, etc., in *Kāvyaṣaṣṭī* 4.36 [Ānandāśrama ed., pp. 130ff.]). Abhinava’s point is that just as *śama* may be found at the center of the energy of the primary rasas, so does a “coming to rest” [*viśrānti*] figure in the nature of the secondary. *viśrāntilābha*, according to Masson and Patwardhan, means *rasapratīti* (ŚĀPA, 135, note, and text: “the attainment of ‘repose’ [i.e., aesthetic enjoyment]”). This, though not incorrect, is too general for the context: see my note 6, Gerow and Aklujkar, “On Śānta Rasa,” 81.

¹⁸¹ *virāṅge* is a tatpuruṣa, not a karmadhāraya (ŚĀPA, 135: “. . . though this aesthetic repose is only secondary”)! The idea that *viśrānti* and *rasa* are synonymous has misled Masson and Patwardhan throughout this passage. Abhinava means that the act of self-abnegation here is secondary to the main rasa of Rāma’s character: the royal “heroic.” (But is this the main rasa, if the *Uttarakāṇḍa* be considered?)

¹⁸² Again, it is not *śrīṅgāra* that is subsidiary here, but śānta in relation to *śrīṅgāra*!

¹⁸³ The query of Masson and Patwardhan on this line is unjustified. Abhinava is simply repeating for emphasis the implication of the preceding illustration, etc. Even as secondaries, a

aimed at (by him) are the three (worldly goals), chief (means) to which is the helping of others.¹⁸⁴ With this in mind, (Bharata), in the (chapter) defining *nāṭaka*, says: “. . . (it is) associated with qualities such as opulence, flirtatious behavior, etc.”¹⁸⁵ By this, he says that all kinds of actions aiming at profit and (satisfaction of) desire, replete with [*pradhāna*] (displays of) opulence and flirtatious behavior, should be introduced into a *nāṭaka*, to (achieve) that beautiful (result) which is a concordance of the hearts of all people. We will explain this in that context. With this in mind, the sage (Bharata) will not prescribe any species of chanting¹⁸⁶ in the case of (the *rasa*) tranquillity. Thus also, the view is refuted which asserts that (the *rasa*) tranquillity does not exist because no species of chanting is prescribed (for it).¹⁸⁷

Others, however, say that Jimūtavāhana, in response to the old woman’s lament: “who is thy savior now, son?” did nothing but save the old woman who had

viśrānti is necessarily observed among the rasas. The use of *sthāyitva* in reference to a *rasa* is a bit puzzling, but I take it as a kind of haplogy: “even though its *bhāva* is by nature stable, tranquillity . . .”

¹⁸⁴ I take this as one possible view, not necessarily the *sidhānta*. Another—closer to Abhinava’s—is introduced below: *anye tu Jimūtavāhanaḥ* . . . The person maintaining this point of view asserts that in the *Nāgānanda* śānta is a subsidiary, because the main theme is still “conquest”—acquisition of the three aims of man (*dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*). The hero employs *paropakṛti* to that end. The incompleteness of this sentence suggests that it is an aside. The problem raised by Masson and Patwardhan is thus avoided (ŚĀPA, 136, note). Abhinava is not implying that śānta can “never be *pradhāna* . . .” but that, in this case, it may effectively be enjoyed, even though not.

¹⁸⁵ N.Ś. 18.11 (G.O.S., vol. 2, p. 412). The *nāṭaka* is the main among the 10 types of drama—and the theoretical model for the others. *Abhijñānaśākuntala* is an example.

¹⁸⁶ *jātyamśa*: Bharata enjoins various kinds of singing as accompaniments to the several rasas (N.Ś. 29.1–13) but does not mention śānta *rasa*.

¹⁸⁷ I.e., the failure to mention śānta means only that these kinds of chanting are inappropriate to it. The sequence of thought here is not easy to grasp. I think Abhinava is suggesting that the presence of worldly display in a drama is not in itself proof that śānta is absent—this would tend also to dispute the view adduced above that the *Nāgānanda*, because it involves such a display, is not *śāntapradhāna*. But of course the question can be raised: which sorts of display are appropriate? The remark *re* chanting means that some are not appropriate. If I am correct, Abhinava, as he often does, is here laying the groundwork, by reviewing the views of others, for his own view—which is that śānta not only can be, but is, predominant—in the *Nāgānanda*, especially.

come to him for help. He has no power at all. Nor did he injure anyone else.¹⁸⁸

This we agree with.¹⁸⁹ It is after all not the province of Buddhas-to-be to live lives of high position, and full of motivation—even if they have the power (to do so). Injunctions do not instruct according to the rule of “the crow and the palm tree.”¹⁹⁰ It is thus established that the primary (rasa) in this (drama) is “striving” as characterized by compassion.¹⁹¹

The other transitory (emotional states) may be (employed) according to circumstances. As has been said: “in the interstices (of a pacified mind) appear other cognitions, owing to the traces (of previous lives).”¹⁹² For this reason, the view which holds that because of inactivity no consequential factors (are present), stands refuted. However, when one has reached the final stage (of meditation), there is an absence of consequential

¹⁸⁸ This view of Jimūtavāhana contrasts with that mentioned earlier: “saving the old woman” was his accomplishment, rather than achieving the “three worlds.” He did as little as possible, being powerless to do either great good or evil. The reference is to *Nāgānanda* 4.9 (Chowkhamba ed.). The quoted words are Jimūtavāhana’s, but he is paraphrasing the old woman, the mother of Śamkhacūḍa.

¹⁸⁹ Doubtless, because it makes it more difficult to argue that *rājāvīrya*—energetic heroism—is the principal rasa of the play.

¹⁹⁰ I think this enigmatic reference is intended to explain the *śaktiś cet* of the preceding line: a bodhisattva will not expend his energy fortuitously (even if he has it); his principles (here: *saṃnyāsa*) must apply uniformly, not randomly—as crows appear, or (cocoa-)nuts drop. Thus is justified Jimūtavāhana’s lack of activity. On the *nyāya*, see *Mīmāṃsākośa*, 1433.

¹⁹¹ This we take to be Abhinava’s siddhānta—not exactly that Jimūtavāhana did nothing, but that his action was restraint of action: the *dayāvīrya* which Abhinava considers a synonym of *śāntarasa* (*Locana* ad 3.26, N.S.P. ed., p. 178)—and not a fourth kind of *vīrarasa*. Masson and Patwardhan have thrown up their hands at this passage (*ŚAPA*, 137, note); but the sense conveyed above is I think free of contradiction, and supports the view of the relation between *śānta* rasa and *tattvajñāna* I have elsewhere defended. It is significant that the passages with which they have had the most trouble (acknowledged with a laudable frankness!) are precisely those that do not fit their thesis. *Śānta*, after all, is a rasa, and must be made to accord with its *aesthetic* kind.

¹⁹² *Y.S.* 4.27. The commentator explains that such cognitions as *asmi*, *jānāmi*, etc., are intended. Abhinava’s point is perhaps that even the yogin experiences *bhāvas*—and so in *śānta* also they may be suitably introduced. The play will thus have the surface texture of any ordinary play. As usual, Masson and Patwardhan see in this remark an effort to distinguish *śānta* from the other rasas. I see it asserting a generality.

factors; this cannot be represented (in the theatre). Even in the case of sexual passion, grief, etc., it is proper not to represent their final stages.¹⁹³

The hearts of men concord (in finding delight) in (such scenes) as are made manifest through the traces (of former lives) that have their source in a knowledge of the truth of the sort (we have described)—as (Bharata) will say: “the dispassionate (rejoice) in liberation.”¹⁹⁴ This concord is not universal nor for all (men): in the fearsome (rasa), there is no heroic character.¹⁹⁵ It might be asked: in such a presentation, what delight is there for the hero(ic type)? We answer: where this¹⁹⁶ is represented [*nibadhyate*], there will necessarily also be (a representation of) erotic passion, heroism, and the like—as helpful to (achieving one or another of) the ends of life.¹⁹⁷ Delight for these (men) will be based on those (rasas employed as adjuncts).¹⁹⁸ Where, as in the case of comedy, a rasa such as the comic is primary, there, too, delight may be based on

¹⁹³ Not “. . . it is correct that there is no possibility of representing . . .” (*ŚAPA*, 137). Abhinava is again at pains to draw the parallel between *śānta* and the other rasas, as far as staging is concerned. The issue in the case of *śrīgāra* is doubtless propriety; of *karuṇa*, perhaps impossibility—but more likely propriety also—for one should not represent death on the stage. In other words, the lack of final representation is not an argument against accepting *śānta* rasa.

¹⁹⁴ *N.Ś.* 28.58. See the note, *ŚAPA*, 137. Masson and Patwardhan take this as a remark tending to the implication that “concordance of the heart” is possible only for those who are adepts in *śānta*. Abhinava’s meaning is that just as the other rasas succeed in tapping the otherwise implicit or latent states [*vāsanā*] that constitute our common mental and emotional life (inherited, of course, from former lives), so does *śānta*—the *vāsanās* here being those which focus on our striving for liberation. The point (again) is rather that *śānta* taps into the same deep strata of our being as do the other rasas.

¹⁹⁵ Presumably meaning that a “heroic” spectator will find little of interest here—and also, if he is heroic, he will not be easily frightened!

¹⁹⁶ *ayam* may refer to the preceding *bhayānaka*, or generally, to any hostile rasa, such as (in this context) *śānta*. It should be borne in mind that the protagonist of *śānta* rasa is not a *vīra* ‘hero’ in the technical sense: see n. 191, above.

¹⁹⁷ *puruṣārthopayogini*. The locative (if correct) probably “agrees” with *tatra*: ‘there—in that work, which is helpful . . .’.

¹⁹⁸ How are Masson and Patwardhan able to take the *tat* of *tanniṣṭhas* as referring to *śānta*? Both grammar and sense require that it refer to the immediately preceding “erotic passion . . .” The question is still: what does the *vīra* enjoy? I.e., (by extension) what would men of ordinary temperament find enjoyable in a *śāntapradhāna* drama?

the other rasas which come into being along with the (primary). Some assert that the cause motivating the division of drama [*rūpaka*] (into ten types) is predicated on the (different) delights which properly belong to the various tenants [*adhikārin*] (of those delights).¹⁹⁹

Therefore, the rasa “tranquillity” exists.²⁰⁰ And so, following (the phrase:) “we will lead the stable emotions to the condition of rasa . . . ,”²⁰¹ there is read in certain old texts this definition of (the rasa) “tranquillity”: “tranquillity is (the rasa) having as its proper stable emotional basis ‘peace’ . . . ”²⁰² In (the view of) these (texts), the delight of all the rasas is tantamount to “tranquillity,”²⁰³ inasmuch as (all the rasas involve a) turning away from (the gross) objects of sense. (Their/its) being grasped as the main thing is “based uniquely on other latent mental impressions [*vāsanāntara*] (deriving from earlier existences).”²⁰⁴ Here, to indicate that it was the stuff [*prakṛti*] out of which all (the rest are made), it is indicated first.²⁰⁵ And in accor-

¹⁹⁹ A view with which Abhinava does not necessarily disagree. It is seen as a further implication of what he definitely does accept, namely, that each rasa, and each primary character thereby implied, has its proper delight. The *hrdayasamvāda* of spectator and character is based on this propriety.

²⁰⁰ This carefully argued conclusion has followed from a consideration of the rasa’s *sthāyin*, its *vi-*, *anu-*, and *vyabhi-cāribhāvas*, and its audience—or “delight.” The argument alone shows how important it is for Abhinava to establish *śānta as a rasa!*

²⁰¹ This line is found in the prose between *N.Ś.* 6.45/46—just before *śṛṅgāra* is taken up. Abhinava there explains it as: “ye sthāyino bhāvā . . . tān api nāma rasatvaṁ viśrāntyekāyatanatvenopadeśādīśa neṣyāmaḥ” “. . . we will lead these stable emotions to a condition of rasa by showing them as (built upon a) single foundation, “calm.” (Here *viśrānti* occurs in the context of *rasapratīti* as such—though it is not a synonym. See n. 180, above.)

²⁰² I do not understand the query put by Masson and Patwardhan to this line (*ŚAPA*, 138, note); Abhinava here defends textually those manuscripts that *do* include the *śāntaprakaraṇa* by remarking that they are ancient. How else would an Indian proceed?

²⁰³ See n. 201, supra.

²⁰⁴ The *iti* perhaps indicates that Abhinava’s source text is again being quoted. *Tanmukhyatālabhaḥ* seems to point back to *sarvarasānām*—but it could, as Masson and Patwardhan take it, point to *śānta (prāyaḥ)*. In the former case, the view here presented does not differ materially from Abhinava’s usual view on the role of the *vāsanās*.

²⁰⁵ Again, Abhinava is probably referring to the text above cited—which appears to have placed *śānta* just after the line “we will lead . . . ” (instead, as in our texts, *śṛṅgāra*).

dance with the maxim that, in the world, one does not count over and over again that which is common, its stable (emotional basis) is not separately mentioned.²⁰⁶ But it has become separate, as the object of that understanding whose mark is the delight (felt by) connoisseurs who have discriminated (it): even what is common will be counted separately by one who discriminates. And also, nine rasas are mentioned in the epics [*itihāsa*] and *purāṇas*, and in the lexica—and (most important of all) in the auspicious “conclusory doctrines” (of our tradition).²⁰⁷ For example:

He should here visualize the “erotic,” etc.,
As belonging to the eight gods;
In the middle (of them), he should visualize
The “tranquil” form of the god of gods.²⁰⁸

Its conditional factors are ascetic detachment, terror in the face of transmigratory existence [*samsārabhīrutā*], and the like. For it is cognized through these, when they are fit together (in a composition). Its consequential factors are concern for teachings about liberation, etc. Its transitory (emotional states) are indifference, reflection, recollection, and steadfastness. Because “devotion” [*bhakti*] and “faith” [*śraddhā*]—infused with recollection, reflection, steadfastness and striving, and focussing on contemplation of the Lord—are both in other ways [*anyathaiiva*] supportive [*aṅga*] (of it), these two are not counted separately as rasas.²⁰⁹ Here we find the summary verse:

The rasa “tranquillity” is to be known
As (that) occasioned by the Supreme Self and liberation;

²⁰⁶ This is indeed a puzzling statement, inasmuch as Abhinava has just cited his text as mentioning a *sthāyibhāva: śānta*. This perhaps refers (obliquely?) to the other candidate for *sthāyin*: the ātman as *tattvajñāna*. Or perhaps all it means is that the *sthāyin* is not mentioned repeatedly [*pṛthak pṛthak*], as being implied in all the other rasas. Visuvalingam adds: “The apparent inconsistency is due only to Abhinava’s unwillingness to express himself explicitly in favor of one or the other tradition.”

²⁰⁷ *siddhāntaśāstreṣu*: or is this other example of Abhinava’s use of the honorific plural?

²⁰⁸ Or, “. . . As the form of the god of gods, ‘tranquillity.’” See, on this verse, *ŚAPA*, 139, note.

²⁰⁹ Other traditions add these two to the list of rasas. The Bengali Vaiṣṇavas make *bhakti* the supreme rasa. See Raghavan, *Number*, ch. 6. By *anyathaiiva* Abhinava probably intends the difference in locus between these candidate rasas (the temple) and *śānta* per se (the theatre).

Having among its causes the aim of knowing the truth;
And is associated with property of supreme felicity.²¹⁰

Here, (“tranquillity”) is shown through the three qualifications of conditional factor, stable basis, and consequential factor, in that order.

Taking up its several occasions
The rasa arises from tranquillity.
Its occasions then vanishing,
It is absorbed in tranquillity.²¹¹

By these and other verses, (this rasa’s) being the stuff of the other rasas is summarized.²¹²

Now, as to what (the sage) will say regarding the *ḍima*, namely, that it “employs six rasas, excluding the erotic and the comic,”²¹³ here is (Bharata’s) meaning: since the *ḍima* has as its primary (rasa) the “violent” [*raudra*], in accordance with the definition immediately following, “. . . which originates in poetry of inflamed [*dīpta*] rasa,”²¹⁴ there is not even the possibility (in it) of “tranquillity”—as incompatible with that (rasa); so why bother to negate it?

But in that case, if tranquillity is impossible, why bother to qualify (the *ḍima*) as “originating in poetry of inflamed rasa”?²¹⁵ The occasion (for the qualification) is his having said that six (rasas) are to be employed, apart from the erotic and the comic.²¹⁶

²¹⁰ A nearly identical verse occurs in the published text of the *śāntarasaprakaraṇa* (G.O.S. ed., p. 333). I take *mokṣādhyātma* as a dvandva; Masson and Patwardhan (*ŚĀPA*, 139) translate as if reading *adhyātmamokṣa*.

²¹¹ *N.Ś.* (G.O.S. ed.), p. 335 (with important variations; the second pāda reads: *śāntād bhāvah pravartate* ‘the emotion [or, feeling] arises from tranquillity’).

²¹² Abhinava’s comment implies that he sees the verse as making a statement about *rasatva*, not about the emotional basis of rasa (see preceding note). The use of the term *prakṛti* here (as above) does suggest that Abhinava sees *śānta* on an evolutionary level prior to the other rasas. Of course, as he has explained above, the other rasas can also be seen as the *prakṛti* ‘matter’ of *śānta*! Perhaps then we should take the compound *rasāntaraprakṛti* as a bahuvrīhi: “having as its matter the other rasas.”

²¹³ *N.Ś.* 18.84d–85ab (G.O.S. ed., vol. 2, p. 443). The *ḍima* is one of the minor “ten genres” of drama. If Bharata’s statement is taken literally, it would appear to exclude even the possibility of *śānta* rasa.

²¹⁴ *N.Ś.* 18.85c.

²¹⁵ *Mutatis mutandis*; or, the biter bit!

²¹⁶ The point is either (as Masson and Patwardhan have it [*ŚĀPA*, 141]) that, without the qualification *dīpta*, ‘inflamed . . .’

But this qualification also excludes (poetry) whose predominant (rasa) is the pitiable, the disgusting, and the fearsome! (We reply:) no! for (that possibility) has been set aside by (the further qualification:) “. . . (the *ḍima*) is associated with the grandiose and violent manners.”²¹⁷ Since, however, the grandiose manner only is appropriate in (the rasa) tranquillity, (saying only that much) would not have excluded it. Therefore, far from (being an argument against tranquillity), the definition of the *ḍima* is an indication of its existence! The case of the erotic (rasa) however (is different), for (it is consistent) with quite violent pursuits (and is thus) brought to mind (by the qualification “. . . inflamed . . .”); and the comic, being supportive of the (erotic),²¹⁸ also has to be negated, because (both of them) are materially relevant [*prāptatvāt*].

Because (this rasa) is identical in all the others [*sarvasāmyāt*], the attribution to it of particular deities, colors, etc., is inappropriate;²¹⁹ nevertheless, it should be noted that they have been postulated.²²⁰ Now, the origin of (the rasa) tranquillity has already been demonstrated. Its involuntary consequential factor is the “comic” (rasa).²²¹ The “heroic” and the “disgusting”

any six of the seven remaining rasas could be used; or that, among the six remaining rasas, those forms have to be excluded that are not *dīpta*. I prefer the latter, because the former appears to repeat the terms of the first question.

²¹⁷ *sātvatyārabhativṛttisampannaḥ*: *N.Ś.* 18.88b. The *vṛttis* are styles of speech and gesture associated with different types of protagonist. Cf. Lévi, *Le Théâtre Indien*, 88.

²¹⁸ Bharata derives four “subsidiary” rasas [*hāsya*, *karuṇa*, *abhūta* and *bhayanaka*] from four “primary” [*śṛṅgāra*, *raudra*, *vīra* and *bībhatsa*]: *N.Ś.* 6.39. His meaning is not entirely clear. S. Visuvalingam’s doctoral dissertation [unpubl.] treats extensively of these four interrelations.

²¹⁹ Abhinava means that, since the other rasas figure as its *vyabhicāribhāvas*, all their deities may by extension be attributed to it.

²²⁰ E.g., the color, *svaccha* ‘clarity’; the deity, Buddha, or the Jina (*Bhārati* ad *N.Ś.* 6.42–46 [G.O.S. ed., pp. 298–99]).

²²¹ I agree with the guess of Masson and Patwardhan (*ŚĀPA*, 142, note) that *sattvabhāva* means *sātvikabhāva*. See n. 89, above. The “origin” of the rasa (preceding line), then, would refer not only to the origin (*vibhāva*, *sthāyin*) but also to the various manifestants (*anubhāva*) and associated states (*vyabhicāribhāva*). Indeed, *sātvika* is the only factor that has not heretofore been specified for *śānta*. It is quite elegant (note, *ibid.*) to presume “laughter” as the *involuntary* manifestant of *śānta*: Śiva laughs! The text, of course, may be corrupt; several emendations have been suggested (e.g., Visuvalingam’s *tasyābhāso* for *sattvabhāva*)—but I have here, as elsewhere, followed Raghavan’s edition, despite its faults.

(rasas) are also among its conditional factors.²²² It follows then, that this rasa (should) teach such things as abstinence, suppression, and contemplating the Lord; that its final benefit [*mahāphala*] is that it confers (skill in) acting;²²³ that it is the most important matter (in aesthetics); and that it suffuses (the elements of) the plot [*itivrta*], etc.²²⁴ Enough of prolixity!

(If it be asked:) what sort of delight (is this—this delight) in the “truth” that (we say) is (appropriate) to it (viz., to *śāntarasa*)?²²⁵ (We) reply: the nature of the Self is such as to be affected by striving, sexual passion, etc., which themselves exude (their particular) affections²²⁶—like a pure white string that shines in the intervals between rare and sumptuous [*umbhita*] jewels; once it has assumed this form, thus does the nature (of that Self) shine forth among the passions, all of them—such being the case [*tathābhāvenāpi*]—(attrac-

²²² Note the *ca* here. Other *vibhāvas* were specified previously. I agree with Masson and Patwardhan that the line should be understood in this way (*ŚAPA*, 142, note), but do not have their problem in accounting for the mention of *vira*—since *vira* is not (see above) the chief rasa of the *Nāgānanda*!

²²³ Three readings here have been defended; I follow Raghavan’s most recent suggestion (*Number* [2nd ed.], 116): *abhinayopayogitayā*. In the first edition (p. 105), he prefers *anupayogitayā* (apparently misread as: *anupabhogitayā*, by Masson and Patwardhan [*ŚAPA*, 142, note—and so translated]). Finally, Kavi gives *anupabhogitayā* as his preferred emendation (G.O.S. ed., p. 340). I do not see the problem Masson and Patwardhan have with Raghavan’s second guess: the text is after all a commentary on the *Nāṭya Śāstra*; and it is inconsequential (on the theological level) to propose that the *mahāphala* of this awesome discipline is “eschewing enjoyment.” Doubtless, Abhinava’s point is that—as far as worldly “fruits” go—a fine performance is a fine thing! Compare Abhinava’s use of the term *mahāphala* in commenting on the *maheśvarasya dāsyam* of the first *kārikā* of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* (vol. 1, p. 29). The actor is also a “servant.” Cf. also Abhinava’s comment ad *N.Ś.* 6.33: “. . . ye tv atathābhūtās teṣāṃ pratyakṣocitatathāvidhacarvaṇālābhāyā naṭādipraksiyā | svagata-krodhaśokādīsankāṭahṛdayagranthibhañjanāya gītādipraksiyā ca muninā viracitā” (vol. 1, p. 291).

²²⁴ Treated in *N.Ś.* ch. 19. See my analysis of the *Śākuntala* according to the Indian theory of plot construction, *JAOS* 99 (1979): 559–72, and 100 (1980): 267–82.

²²⁵ I think this question concerns *āsvāda* only: “even if all you (Abhinava) have said is the case, what sense does it make to claim to ‘enjoy’ the truth?” Knowing it is enough. I take *tattvāsvāda* as a *tapuruṣa*, parallel to *tattvajñāna*. We might also read *tat tv āsvādah*—the force of the question would be even clearer.

²²⁶ *uparakta*, *uparāga*: “affection” comes close to capturing the *double entendre* of a “color” that is also “attractive.”

tively) affective, according to the maxim: “this Self appears once.”²²⁷ Devoid of all the complex of sufferings that derive from looking away (from it), it shines out from both poetic and practical²²⁸ works generally as that single consciousness through which is attained supreme delight—and, by distinguishing (itself) in the interior condition (of the spectator), effects a sensibility of the same sort, which leads to (the experience of) a transcendental joy.²²⁹

Thus, there are but nine rasas. These many only have been taught, either as being useful in (attaining the) aims of man, or as (involving) a surfeit of delight. Thus the view has been refuted which asserts that this number has been fixed upon, even though others are possible, because (only so many) are familiar to the audience. This will be explained (further) in the chapter on the emotions.²³⁰ False (the notion) that there is a rasa “fondness” [*sneha*], whose stable basis is “unguency” [*ārdratā*]. Fondness is nothing but an “inclination” [*abhiśaṅga*], and it is completely subsumed in sexual passion, striving, etc. Thus the fondness of the child for its parents comes to rest in fear (that they depart); that of a youth for his friends, in (sexual) passion;²³¹ that of Lakṣmaṇa for his brother (Rāma) in the heroism of duty, etc. Similarly considered is that of an elder for the son, etc. The same path may be taken, when refuting (the notion that there is) a rasa “fickleness” [*laulya*] whose stable basis is “greed” [*gardha*]. It is subsumed either in the “comic” or the “erotic” or elsewhere. The same may be said of “devotion.”

²²⁷ Once recognized, it cannot be forgotten. The figure (itself beautiful) of the passions enhancing the beauty of the soul by “modulating” it—as the necklace gains in beauty by the multiplicity of its jewels—sums up Abhinava’s view of the role of art in the cosmos—a very ambiguous figure that seems to attribute to art a cosmic function!

²²⁸ Perhaps, “poetry” and “drama” (so Masson and Patwardhan, *ŚAPA*, 142). But *prayoga* is also used of “practical” worship, etc.

²²⁹ Appropriately, the *śāntaprakaraṇa* closes by reminding us of the major cosmic thesis of the *Pratyabhijñā*: the self-division of consciousness into outer and inner worlds, ever corresponding and ever finding delight in the correspondence. It is, it seems, in *śānta* that this delight is (from the inner side) met and recognized, but as the solemn phrases intimate, this inner delight is but a reflection of a cosmic delight informing all being. I do not think Masson and Patwardhan have grasped the full flavor of this passage.

²³⁰ The seventh chapter; the commentary is in large part lost.

²³¹ Either *rati* is bi-sexual (!) or the “passion” it implies may be asexual! Normally, *rati* does not include “friendship.” *Visuvalingam* adds: “This remark is not so surprising—Śakti (incarnated in the sexed couple).”